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Abstract
I study equilibrium behavior in games for which players have some preference for appearing to be well-
informed. In chapter one, I study the effect of such preferences in a dynamic game where players have
preferences for appearing to be well-informed about the actions of past players. I find that such games display
cyclical behavior, which I interpret as a model of `fads'. I show that the speed of the fads is driven by the
information available to less well-informed players. In chapter two, I study the effect of such preferences in a
static game of voting with many players. Prior work studies voting games in which player's preferences are
determined only by some disutility of voting, as well as some concern for swaying the outcome of the election
to one's favored candidate. This literature finds that, in equilibrium, a vanishingly small percentage of the
population votes, since the chance of swaying the election disappears as more players vote, while the cost of
voting remains high for all. I introduce uncertainty about the quality of the candidates, as well as a preference
for appearing to be well-informed about the candidates. I find that high levels of voter turnout are supported
in equilibrium even when the number of players in the game is large. This resolves the empirical puzzle of why
the chance of swaying the election should matter, given that it is very small.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN SOCIAL NORMS
Nicholas Janetos
Steven Matthews
My dissertation studies equilibrium behavior in games for which players have some pref-
erence for appearing to be well-informed. In chapter one, I study the eect of such prefer-
ences in a dynamic game where players have preferences for appearing to be well-informed
about the actions of past players. In the main result, I nd that such games display cyclical
behavior, which I interpret as a model of ‘fads’. I show that the speed of the fads is driven
by the information available to less well-informed players. In chapter two, I study the eect
of such preferences in a static game of voting with many players. Prior work studies voting
games in which player’s preferences are determined only by some disutility of voting, as well
as some concern for swaying the outcome of the election to one’s favored candidate. is
literature nds that, in equilibrium, a vanishingly small percentage of the population votes,
since the chance of swaying the election disappears as more players vote, while the cost of
voting remains high for all. I introduce uncertainty about the quality of the candidates, as
well as a preference for appearing to be well-informed about the candidates. I nd that high
levels of voter turnout are supported in equilibrium even when the number of players in the
game is large. is resolves the empirical puzzle of why the chance of swaying the election
should matter, given that it is very small.
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Introduction
Fads are a pervasive economic phenomenon, and large industries (advertising, branding,
etc.) exist with the goal of inuencing which products are âĂŸin vogueâĂŹ by inuencing
who is perceived to be choosing which actions. In chapter one, ‘Fads and imperfect informa-
tion’, I provide a framework to analyze such behavior, grounded in rational agents, and based
on asymmetric information. I model fads as an equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game
with imperfect information.e game has high- and low-type players who dier from each
other in two ways. First, all players want to match the actions of high-types and want not
to match the actions of low-types. Second, the high-type players have access to better infor-
mation about the actions chosen by players in the past—although no player has any special
ability to identify which types chose which actions. e high-type players are interpreted
as a well-connected âĂŸin-groupâĂŹ, and the low-type players as an âĂŸout-groupâĂŹ.
For example, the high-type players may be interpreted as people who live in Manhattan, the
low-types as people who live in a rural area, and the actions as some choice between styles
of clothing to wear. Equilibria of this game display cyclical behavior. Initially, the high-type
players coordinate on an action. Over time, the low-type players learn which action this
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is, and start playing it too. Eventually, a tipping point is reached, and the high-type play-
ers switch to coordinate on a dierent action. ey can do so because they are the rst to
perceive that an action has become too popular. ese dynamics then repeat, with players
periodically switching between actions.
I argue that the model formalizes an intuition about the dynamics of social identity. We
draw credible, positive inferences about well-dressed people—not because they signal their
wealth by buying expensive clothing, but because they signal that they are the sort of people
who understand what one wears in order to appear âĂŸwell-dressedâĂŹ.e key insight of
this chapter is that when the out-group can learnwhatmembers of the in-group are wearing,
the meaning of âĂŸwell-dressedâĂŹ must shi over time to remain credible, and the rate
at which it shis is driven by the speed at which the out-group learns. Equilibria of the
game have surprising properties. Low-type players fail to coordinate on the high-typeâĂŹs
actions because they have access to information which is more âĂŸout-of-dateâĂŹ about
the actions of others. Giving low-type players more up-to-date information causes them to
learn faster, and high-type players to switch more rapidly.e net eect on welfare is zero.
e model, therefore, suggests an explanation for why we cycle through fads more rapidly
today than a century ago: the increasing democratization of information (through radio,
television, social media, etc.) has made it easier for the out-group to learn, speeding up
fads, even if it has not improved their welfare. I show also that low-type players behave as
if they had preferences for conformity.ey simply imitate the actions they see were taken
in the past. On the other hand, high-type players sometimes behave as if conformist, and
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sometimes behave as if anti-conformist. Finally, I consider several extensions to the model.
In one, the in-group has access to older information about the actions of other players; in this
case, they coordinate on actions which appear relatively less popular recently. In another,
players have preferences for appearing to be part of the out-group; in this case, no cyclical
dynamics can be supported, and players simply randomize independently over actions.
Chapter two, ‘Voting as a signal of education’, is motivated by the two facts that voters in
theUS are, on average, better educated than the population as awhole, and that self-reported
voter turnout is signicantly higher than actual voter turnout. is suggests that there is
a reputational aspect to voting driven by a concern for appearing to be well-informed. I
study voting game in which some players are better informed about the candidates standing
for election. All players have the same cost to voting and preferences for swaying the elec-
tion, and, most importantly, all players have a reputational concern for appearing to be well-
informed through their voting choice. In the game, as the number of players grows large, the
chance of any individual voter swaying the election (the pivot probability) disappears. Voters
endogenously tend to be better-informed than non-voters, and so a large percentage of play-
ers vote—even in large elections—in order to signal their education.e signaling is driven
not be heterogeneity in the cost of voting, but by heterogeneity in voterâĂŹs beliefs about
the value of swaying the election. In contrast to other literature on voting as signaling, the
pivot probability plays an important role in driving voter turnout.e paper thus provides a
resolution to the âĂŸparadox of votingâĂŹ, demonstrating that large levels of voter turnout
can be supported even when the chance of swaying the election is very small. Improving the
3
quality of all playerâĂŹs information has an ambiguous eect on voter turnout.is result
sheds light on the puzzle that that over the past century, educational attainment in the US
has signicantly increased, while voter participation has not, even as voting participation
and education are correlated.
4
1 | Fads and imperfect information
1.1 Introduction
An important feature of consumer choice is that it is observed to shi over time, and in a
way so that choices are correlated among individuals. For example, in the United States in
the 1990s, consumers tended to choose loose-tted clothing over tight-tted clothing. In
the 2000s, consumers tended to choose tight-tted clothing instead.is back and forth in
Western culture can be traced back centuries, to the tight and baggy breeches of Rennais-
sance Europe.
As a positive model of this phenomenom, the standard economic model of consumer
choice is unsatisfactory because it requires us to accept time-varying and correlated prefer-
ences. Such a model is both intractable, and can explain too much behavior. In this paper, I
take a dierent approach. I analyze a dynamic game between two types of short-lived play-
ers, high and low, each choosing between two equally costly actions, and who dier from
each other in two ways. First, all of the players have preferences for matching the action of
the high type players. In the main paper, I model this with a game in which players who
5
have made the same action choice randomly match with each other, and derive utility from
matchingwith high type players. Second, the players dier in the quality of information they
possess about the actions of players in the past. I mainly consider the case in which high type
players have better information than low type players about the actions of past players, and
consider other cases in extensions. Players have no special ability to distinguish which types
of players choose which actions, rather, they only observe some information informative
about the relative fractions of players who choose each action in the past. In the body of this
paper, I model this in the following way. I assume that once a player makes an action choice,
their choice (but not their type) is visible for some (stochastic) period of time to other play-
ers. Technically, this corresponds to assuming that players observe a time-weighted average
of past actions. High type players see an average of past actions which places more weight
on more recent actions.
To x an example, consider the high type players as being those who live in or near
major population centers, and low type players as being those who live in or near rural or
surburban regions, and consider the action choice as being between loose or baggy clothing.
e interpretation, then, is that players prefer to dress like those who live in the city, and that
those in the city have more up-to-date information about the sorts of clothing other players
are wearing. It is not dicult to invent other examples. High type players may be those who
have many friends on Facebook, low type players are those who do not have many friends,
and the choice set is possible news articles to share. Or, high types may be white, low types
may be Asian, and the choice set is possible extra-curricular activities to engage in before
6
applying to a college which wishes to covertly discriminate against Asians.
I focus on stationary equilibria of this game, and I show they may be classied into two
groups. In the rst, players mix independently and identically between actions. No non-
trivial dynamics arise from this group of equilibria. Playersmay all coordinate on one action,
or another, or mix equally between both. In the second, players periodically switch between
action choices.ese dynamics are driven by the following intuition. Initially, the high type
players coordinate on an action. Over time, the low type players learn which action the high
type players are coordinating on, and start to choose that action. At some endogenously
determined ‘tipping point’, the high type players switch to coordinate on a dierent action,
while the low type players continue to coordinate on the ‘old’ action.e high type players
are the rst to switch because they are the rst to percieve that the trend has ‘played itself
out’. e cycle then repeats, with high type players periodically switching between actions,
and low type players following.
Equilibria of the model have features, broadly consistent with stylized facts, that might
otherwise seem counter-intuitive. Less-informed players mimic the actions they see others
taking, even though they may be mimicking the actions of other less-informed players. In
this sense, less-informed players display instrumental preferences for conforming to thema-
jority action, even though they do not have direct preferences for conformity. Well-informed
players sometimes mimic the actions they see others taking, and sometimes do not, so that
well-informed players sometimes appear to have preferences for conformity, and sometimes
appear to have preferences for anti-conformity.ese distinctions are best illustrated by an
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example: When I go to buy clothing, I tend to buy the sorts of clothing that I see others
around me wearing. An economist observing my choices might reasonably conclude that I
have a preference for conforming to what others are doing, i.e., I prefer to look like those
around me. However, if I go to buy clothing with a fashionable friend, who recommends
I buy a pair of pants that I haven’t seen anyone else wearing, I strictly prefer his recom-
mendation over any choice I would have made. An economist observing my choices in this
case might reasonably conclude the opposite, that I have preferences for anti-conformity,
i.e., I prefer not to look like those around me. In both cases the economist is wrong, my
choices are driven not by any intrinsic preferences for conformity or anti-conformity, but
rather the information available to me about what certain classes of players are wearing. In
this sense, the model considered in this paper is a dynamic extension of Bernheim (1994),
in providing a rationale for the dynamics of conformist and anti-conformist behavior that
is not directly grounded in direct preferences for conformity. In general, we draw negative
inferences about people who are perceived to be conformist; the model suggests a rationale
for why, since only less-informed players consistently act as if conformist.
I show also that the rate at which players switch between actions is driven by the speed
of learning of less-informed players. If less-informed players only learn which action the
well-informed players are coordinating on slowly, then the well-informed players switch
less rapidly.e additional information available to well-informed players, however, has no
eect on the rate at which players switch between actions. It serves purely as a coordination
device. A broad stylized fact of the past few centuries is that the rate at which fads begin
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and end has increased. e shi from Renaissance-era baggy breeches to tight breeches
took centuries, the shi from loose tting pants in the 2000s to tight tting pants took a
decade. e model suggests that this phenomenon is driven by two factors. e rst is the
increasing visibility of well-informed elites. In the 1600s, this might have been the nobility,
in 1980, it was popular musicians and actors.e second is the increasing democratization
of information. In the 1800s, itmay have takenweeks for information to spread among elites.
In 1950, it still took weeks for information to spread among elites. But due to the invention
of widely available sources of information such as broadcast television or the radio, what
took decades to spread among non-elites in the 1800s might have only taken a few years in
1950. Accordingly, the model predicts that the length of fads in the 1800s should have been
on the order of decades, while the length of fads in 1950 should have been on the order of
years.
is democratization of information might have been expected to improve the welfare
of less-informed non-elites. I show that contrary to this intuition, it has no eect on welfare.
Ononehand, the less-informed learn fasterwhich action thewell-informed are coordinating
on, but on other hand, the well-informed switch more rapidly between actions. Together,
these two eects exactly cancel out.
e model suggests that policies intended to help less-informed players have no eect
on welfare if broadly targeted. For example, some people know that it is customary to wear a
suit to a white-collar job interview. We do not wear suits to job interviews because we want
to signal we can aord a suit, we wear suits to job interviews to signal that we are the sort
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of person who understands that the sort of thing one does to get a job at a job interview
is wear a suit, and that therefore, we are the sort of person who also understands the other
sorts of things that one does in an oce environment to be successful. Telling one person,
who otherwise would have worn a t-shirt, to wear a suit to a job interview might improve
her payo, telling everyone who might otherwise have worn a t-shirt to a job interview to
wear a suit will have no eect, since the value of wearing a suit to a job interview came only
because it credibly signaled that some people are well-informed.
1.1.1 Previous literature
Previous literature on the switching dynamics considered in this paper (Karni and Schmei-
dler, 1990; Matsuyama, 1992; Frijters, 1998; Caulkins et al., 2007) focus on models in which
cyclical behavior is driven by dierences in preferences, or technology (‘conformists vs. anti-
conformists’ or ‘predator / prey’ models).
e paper conceptually closest to this one is Corneo and Jeanne (1999). ere, as in
this paper, one sort of player has access to better information than the other, such as the
right restaurant to eat at. Gradually, the βs learn which restaurant is cool, and the authors
analyze the dynamics of this learning process. However, they stop short of considering how
players might switch to other restaurants once everyone has learned where to eat, and how
this might impact the dynamics of the game; in the limit, players end up all pooling on one
action.emajor dierence to this paper is that inCorneo and Jeanne (1999), players private
information is about some exogenous state variable, here, the relevant private information of
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players is about the actions of other players, which I show gives rise to equilibrium switching
dynamics.
e question of why we observe fashion and fashion trends is an old one in economics
(Foley, 1893). Previous literature on fashion cycles focuses on Veblen goods and conspicu-
ous consumption. In Pesendorfer (1995), a monopolist periodically releases new, expensive
clothing lines, giving the wealthy an opportunity to buy expensive clothing to signal their
wealth, then gradually lowers the price of the clothing to sell to more people, before even-
tually releasing a new line of expensive clothing and beginning the process again. Here, the
monopolist is a ‘norm entrepreneur’ (Sunstein, 1995), strategically manufacturing social as-
sets for prot. It is true that there are examples of monopolist fashion brands at the high end
of the market—but fashion, and fashion cycles, are a much broader phenomenon, and not
limited to high-end clothing. For example, no norm entrepreneur decided that car tailns,
which serve no aerodynamic purpose and are no more expensive than conventional styling,
should be popular in the 1950s, and Plutarch (187) describes Cato the Younger wearing a
subdued shade of purple, in reaction to what was then a trend among the Romans of wear-
ing a bright shade of red. Nobody prots from the recent trend towards using ‘Emma’ as a
girl’s name, and many fashion trends involve clothing which is deliberately inexpensive.
Other related papers include the literature on social learning (Bikhchandani et al., 1992),
and more specically the literature on social learning with bounded memory, Kocer (2010).
ere, players do not observe (or remember, if players are interpreted as being long-lived)
the full history of actions; here, players see only a summary statistic of past actions, and
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furthermore, there is no underlying state of the world which players draw inferences about.
e idea behind this paper is the same one behind the literature on supporting correlated
equilibria in static games bymodeling them as the result of a dynamic game in which players
condition in some way on the actions of players in the past (Aumann, 1987; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1991; Foster andVohra, 1997). I apply the same concept, but require player’s learning
process to be Bayesian. For any dynamic (Nash) equilibrium in my model, in any period,
the resulting distribution over action proles is a correlated equilibria of the static game,
however, the set of correlated static equilibria which can be supported by dynamic equilibria
in this way is much smaller than the set of all correlated equilibria in the static stage game.
Although the empirical study of fads began much earlier, there is a recent interest in
applying modern econometric techniques to identifying fads (Yoganarasimhan, 2012a,b).
e ability to identify the ‘next big thing’ is of obvious interest to rms which sell consumer
products. An industry of ‘coolhunters’ revolves around identifying what will be in fashion
and what will be out of fashion.
In Section 1.2, I illustrate the main idea with a simple example model. In Section 1.3, I
describe the stage game, and prove some basic results about equilibria in the static environ-
ment. In Section 1.4 I describe the full dynamic game. In Section 1.4.1, I use analogous results
to those in the static environment to characterize equilibria in the dynamic game. I show
that a feature of all equilibria in the dynamic game is that β players show an instrumental
preference for conformity. In Section 1.5, I apply the results from Section 1.4.1 to a parame-
terization of the game to explicitly compute equilibria and derive comparative statics results
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on the period length of the game and the strategies played by α players. In Section 1.6 I
consider a generalization of the model in which α players are allowed to have access to older
information about the actions of other players, and players may prefer to mimic β players.
In Section 2.4 I conclude.
1.2 Illustrative example
I begin with a simple discrete time example to illustrate the two major mechanisms driving
equilibrium dynamics in this paper: First, the preferences of players to match high type, but
not low type actions, and second, the better information of high type players. e game
analyzed in this section is simple, but not easily extendable, and so in the main body of the
paper, I consider a richer continuous time model.
Model
Consider a discrete time (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) game. In each period, a continuumof players enters,
each makes a once-and-for-all binary action choice a ∈ {0, 1}, and then each exits.1 With
equal probability, each player is either a high or a low type, denoted θ ∈ {α, β}. Once each
player has chosen an action, a single player is sampled uniformly from the set of players, and
his action choice, denoted at , is made visible to future players. Before a player chooses an
action, he sees a truncated history of past sampled actions. Specically, a low type player in
period t sees the past action, at−1. A high type player, on the other hand, sees the past N > 1
1at there be a continuumof players is not here necessary, but instead convenient for formulating payos.
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actions, (at−1, at−2, . . . , at−N). (e initial players see no actions, and the second through
N − 1st players, if the high type, see the entire history.) Hence, the information sets of a
player of type θ in period t, H tθ , are
H0α = {}
H1α = {(a0)}
H2α = {(a0, a1)}
H tα = {(at−3, at−2, at−1}∀t ≥ 3
H0β = {}
H tβ = {at−1}∀t ≥ 1.
elements of which are denoted htθ .
Once each player has chosen an action, players randomly and uniformly match with the
other players who chose the same action. Players who choose an action which no other
player has chosen receive a payo of 0. Players who match with a high type player receive a
payo of 1. Players who match with a low type player receive a payo of 0. Players therefore
prefer to choose actions which are more likely to be chosen by high type players, and less
likely to be chosen by low type players.
Player strategies are σ θt ∶ H tθ → [0, 1], denoting the probability that player t, of type θ,
chooses action a = 1 in period t. A strategy prole induces beliefs, which is a probability
distribution over both the type of the player whose action was selected to be visible, and the
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action chosen by that player, denoted µ ∈ ∆(Θ∞ × {0, 1}∞). Random variables with respect
to the probability measure representing beliefs are denoted with tildes, so that h˜tβ represents
a low type player’s uncertainty over the previous period action. Formally, a player’s payo is
1 if and only if he is matched with a high type player, and 0 otherwise. Note that a high type
player who chooses an action expects, at the interim stage, a payo of
Ut(a, µ, htα , htβ) = Pµ(θ t = α ∣ at , at−1, at−2, . . . , at−N),
that is, a player’s interim expected payo is the probability that a player randomly selected
from the group of players who choose the same action is a high type player. A low type
player’s interim expected payo, aer choosing a, is then Eµ[Ut(a, µ, h˜tα , h˜tβ) ∣ htβ].
e denition of equilibrium is standard:
Denition ⟨σ θt , µ⟩ is an equilibrium i
1. Each player is best responding, so that σ tθ(htθ) has support contained within
argmax
a∈{0,1} Eµ[Ut(a, µ, h˜tα , h˜tβ) ∣ htθ],
2. and beliefs, µ, are consistent with σ θt wherever possible.
Analysis
is simplemodel captures the two important components of themain game. First, low type
players have worse information than high type players, in the sense that their information
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is a coarsening of the high type player’s information. Second, players have preferences for
matching the action which would be taken by high type players, and notmatching the action
which would be taken by low type players. Consider the following two candidate strategy
proles and beliefs, which mirror those analyzed later in the continuous-time game.
Example 1 (‘Pooling’ strategy prole). Under this strategy prole, players coordinate on action
1. Formally,
σ θt (htθ) = 1∀θ , t, htθ ,
and µ satises
Pµ(a0, θ0, a1, θ1, . . . , at , θ t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 ∃i ∣ ai = 0
( 12)t otherwise.
is pooling strategy prole is one in which players coordinate on action a = 1, and de-
viators receive the lowest possible payo, 0. Unsurprisingly, it is also an equilibrium strategy
prole.
Proposition 1. e pooling strategy prole described in Example 1 is an equilibrium strategy
prole.
Proof. Since in equilibrium all players choose a = 1, the probability that a player is an α type,
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Figure 1.1: Two equilibrium path realizations of the pooling (top) and periodic (bottom)
equilibria.
On the top, all the players coordinate on one action (represented by black). On the bottom, with N = 3, the
players coordinate on an action until N ≥ 3, and a high type player comes along, at which point they switch.
(Here, at t = 3, t = 7, and t = 10.)
conditional on a = 1, is always 1/2, and so for all on-path histories htα , htβ,
Ut(1, µ, htα , htβ) = 12
Ut(0, µ, htα , htβ) = 0,
and so on-path, a = 1 is trivially a best-reply.
Figure 1.1 contains an illustration of the pooling strategy prole. In this case, all the
players pool on one action.
A more interesting strategy prole, which is also an equilibrium strategy prole is the
following:
Example 2 (‘Periodic’ strategy prole). Under this strategy prole, low type players mimic the
past action chosen, while high type players mimic the past action, unless all N observed actions
17
are the same, in which case, they choose a dierent action. Formally,
σ βt (htβ) = at−1
σ αt (htα) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 − at−1 at−1 = ⋯ = at−N
at−1 otherwise.
It remains to specify the actions of the rst N players. e rst player uniformly chooses an
action, independently of type.e next N − 1 players choose actions in the following way:
1. With probability
2(N − 1
N + 1)
1
N − 1
the tth player, 1 ≤ t < N − 1, mimics the previous action, at = at−1.
2. Otherwise, the tth player mixes uniformly between actions.
(e purpose of this somewhat articial specication of the rst N player’s actions is to generate
stationary beliefs. It is not strictly necessary, but assumed for tractability and simplicity.)
Proposition 2. e periodic strategy prole described in Example 2 is an equilibrium strategy
prole when N ≥ 5.
Proof. First, since players t = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1 choose actions with the same type-independent
frequency, the expected payos from choosing either action are the same, and so any strategy
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is a best reply. Second, I state without proof that the players at t = N believe
Pµ(aN−1 = aN−2 = ⋯ = ai) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2
N+1 i = 0
1
N+1 otherwise.
(1.2.1)
(In fact, the actions of the rst N players were constructed specically so that (1.2.1) holds!)
Consider rst whether the high type players are best responding at t = N . In the event
that the past N players are observed to be choosing the same action, each high type player
knows that each other high type player will be choosing 1− aN−1, and so optimally each high
type player prefers to choose 1− aN−1, receiving an expected payo of 1 (since only high type
players choose 1 − aN−1 at this history) instead of 0 (since only low type players choose aN−1
at this history). In the event that the pastN players are not observed to be choosing the same
action, each high type player expects that no other player will be choosing a dierent action,
and so optimally each high type player prefers to continue to mimic action aN−1, knowing
that if they choose 1 − aN−1, they will receive a payo of zero, instead of 12 (the probability
that a player choosing action aN−1 is a high type player.) High type players, then, are trivially
best responding at t = N , because choosing the same action as high type players is a best
response.
Now consider whether the low type players are best responding at t = N by mimicking
at−1. From (1.2.1), with probability 2N+1 , the past N actions are the same, and by mimicking
at−1, a low type player receives a payo of zero (since all the high type players are choosing
1− aN−1), instead of 1. With probability 1− 2N+1 , at least one of the past N actions diers, and
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by mimicking at−1, a low type player receives a payo of 12 (since all players are mimicking
the past action) instead of 0. e low type player’s best reply condition is satised, then, if
and only if
2
N + 1 × 0 + (1 − 2N + 1) × 12 ≥ 2N + 1 × 1 + (1 − 2N + 1) × 0.
is condition is satised if and only if N ≥ 5.
Similar reasoning establishes that players are best replying in successive periods t = N +
1,N + 2, . . ., if beliefs are stationary. In fact, they are. To see this, x t, and let Pn denote the
probability that at−n = at−n+1 = at−1.en by construction,
PN = Probability that last N − 1 were the sameucurlyPN−1 +
Probability that last N were the same but low type was drawnucurly1
2
PN
Pn = Pn−1∀1 < n < N
P1 = 12PN
∑
n
Pn = 1.
e unique solution for these beliefs is
PN = 2N + 1
Pn = 1N + 1 ∀n < N ,
so that beliefs are stationary, and so the result follows for N ≥ 5.
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is simple model illustrates the main channel driving periodic dynamics in the main
model of the paper. Low type player mimic past actions, absent a better idea of whether
other players are conforming to the previous action or not. High type players occasionally
conform, and occasionally anti-conform when they percieve that suciently many other
players are choosing the same action. In the remainder of the paper, I analyze a richermodel,
capable of providing comparative statics results.e main channel, however, is similar.
1.3 Static stage game
Acontinuumof players, some called αs and some called βs, play the following simultaneous-
move stage game. First, nature draws a state, ρ⃗ ∈ [0, 1]2, from a distribution µ ∈ ∆([0, 1]2).
Denote the realized state by (ρα , ρβ), and the random variable by (ρ˜α , ρ˜β). Players then
observe private information:e α players observe (ρα , ρβ), while the β players observe only
ρβ. Each player simultaneously chooses an action a ∈ {0, 1}. I focus on symmetric mixed
strategies,2 denoted Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ [0, 1] and Aβ(ρβ) ∈ [0, 1], mapping private information
into the probability of choosing a = 1.
Once players have chosen actions, each player receives a payo, which is a function of his
2e analysis in the paper goes through if, instead of focusing on symmetric mixed strategies, we were to
focus on pure strategies in which players condition on their index in such a way so that the same fractions of
player types choose the same actions. By the law of large numbers, this can always be done. E.g., we could have
instead of the symmetric mixed strategy Aβ(ρβ), we could have
Aβ i(ρβ) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 i ≤ Aβ(ρβ)0 i > Aβ(ρβ),
where i is the index of the player. Under the appropriate assumptions on i (namely that it be uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1]) the two approaches are equivalent.
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action, and the fraction of players of each type choosing his action. Formally, each player’s
payo function is U(a, aα , aβ), where a is his action, and aα and aβ are the fractions of α
and β players choosing action 1. Note that α and β players have the same payo function.
Since there are many players, by the law of large numbers we have, in state (ρα , ρβ),
aα(ρα , ρβ) = Aα(ρα , ρβ),
aβ(ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ).
I impose the following assumption on payos:
Assumption 1. U(1, aα , aβ) > U(0, aα , aβ) if and only if aα > aβ.
Assumption 1 formalizes the intuition that all players strictly prefer an action if more
α than β players are choosing that action. is may be because players have reputational
concerns for appearing to be α players, conditional on the action they take. Or, players may
have intrinsic preferences for choosing the same actions as αs (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000),
because they identify with αs but not with βs. Or, aer the stage game, players may go on
to play a subgame, the payos to which depend on the action chosen in the stage game, as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 (Matching utility). Interpret the action as a location choice, a = 0 or a = 1, and
introduce a matching subgame in which players are randomly matched to another player at the
location they choose. ey then receive a payo of 1 if their partner is an α type, and a payo
of 0 otherwise. e expected payo of a player at location a the probability that a randomly
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drawn player is an α, conditional on the action taken,
U(a, aα , aβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
aα
aα+aβ a = 1
1−aα
1−aα+1−aβ a = 0,
(1.3.1)
On the boundaries, when aα = aβ = 0 or aα = aβ = 1, assume U(a, aα , aβ) = 0∀a.3
e payo specication in Example 3 will bemaintained as an example for the remainder
of the paper.
1.3.1 Equilibria of the stage game
To x ideas, I derive Bayesian equilibria of the static stage game.ere are many such equi-
libria.
e game has trivial equilibria, indexed by p ∈ [0, 1], in which both sorts of players
disregard their private information and mix independently between 0 and 1, each choos-
ing a = 1 with probability p. is follows from Assumption 1, which implies U(1, p, p) =
U(0, p, p)∀p ∈ [0, 1], and somixing is trivially a best responsewhenAα(ρα , ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ) =
p.
On the other hand, in no equilibria do α players coordinate on action 1 while β’s mix, i.e.,
Aα(ρα , ρβ) ≡ 1,Aβ(ρβ) ∈ (0, 1)∀ρβ. In this case, it is commonly known that Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 1,
and so aα > aβ, hence; by Assumption 1, U(1, 1, aβ) > U(0, 1, aβ), and so β players strictly
3It is only important thatU(1, aα , aβ) = U(0, aα , aβ). On the boundaries, these payos technically violate
Assumption 1, since U is constant in aβ when aα = 0.
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prefer to choose action 1.
Are there equilibria in which the α players condition on their additional private infor-
mation in a non-trivial way? More precisely, are there equilibria in which the α players, with
positive probability, choose a dierent action prole than the β players? e answer is yes.
To see this, rst, we note that in any equilibrium, α players are always either all playing 0,
all playing 1, or mixing with the same frequency as β players:
Lemma 1. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ be an equilibrium strategy prole. en Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρβ), 1}
for all (ρα , ρβ).
Proof. e result follows directly from Assumption 1. If Aα(ρα , ρβ) < Aβ(ρβ), then
U(1, aα , aβ) < U(0, aα , aβ),
and so Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 0 is the unique best reply. Similarly, if Aα(ρα , ρβ) > Aβ(ρβ), then
Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 1 is the unique best reply. Finally, if Aα(ρα , ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ) the result holds.
Second, we note that in any equilibrium, β players are indierent between actions:
Lemma 2. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ be an equilibrium strategy prole. en β players are always indif-
ferent between actions 0 and 1. at is, the following indierence condition is satised for all
ρβ ∈ [0, 1]:
P(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρβ) × (U(0, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ)))
= P(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρβ) × (U(1, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ))) (1.3.2)
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Proof. Fix ρˆβ ∈ [0, 1]. Either Aβ(ρˆβ) = 0, or Aβ(ρˆβ) ∈ (0, 1), or Aβ(ρˆβ) = 1.
First, if Aβ(ρˆβ) ∈ (0, 1), the β players are mixing and so indierent between actions.
Second, if Aβ(ρˆβ) = 0, then by Lemma 1, Aα(ρα , ρˆβ) ∈ {0, 1} for all {ρα ∣ (ρα , ρˆβ) ∈
Supp(µ)}. Dene p0, p1 by
pa ∶= Pµ[Aβ(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = a ∣ ρ˜β = ρˆβ], a ∈ {0, 1}.
en a β player’s expected payo from a = 0 is weakly less than his expected payo from
a = 1, since by Assumption 1
p0U(0, 0, 0) + p1U(0, 1, 0) = p0U(1, 0, 0) + p1U(0, 1, 0)
≤ p0U(1, 0, 0) + p1U(1, 1, 0),
with strict inequality if and only if p1 = 0.e best response condition then implies that β’s
are indierent between a = 0 and a = 1.
e case in which Aβ(ρˆβ) = 1 is analogous. To write the indierence condition, a β
player’s expected payos from action a is
E[U(a,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β)) ∣ ρβ]
= p1U(a, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) + p0U(a, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) + (1 − p0 − p1)U(a,Aβ(ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)),
Equating the expected payo from a = 1 to a = 0 and re-writing with Assumption 1 (which
25
implies U(1,Aβ(ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)) = U(0,Aβ(ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)) always) yields (1.3.2).
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 together yields the following characterization of equilib-
ria. For ease of exposition, we now assume that µ has full support on [0, 1]2 is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on the unit square.4
Proposition 3. ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ is an equilibrium of the static game if and only if, for all (ρα , ρβ) ∈
[0, 1]2,
1. Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρβ), 1} and
2. Aβ solves (1.3.2).
Proof. at these conditions are necessary follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2 and the
fact that µ has full support on [0, 1]2.
To see that these conditions are also sucient, note rst that if all α players are choosing
action a = 1, then by Assumption 1, U(1, 1, aβ) ≥ U(0, 1, aβ)∀aβ ∈ [0, 1], so that choosing
a = 1 is a best reply. Similar reasoning sucies to show that when all α players choose a = 0,
it is a best reply for all α players to choose a = 0. Finally, when Aα(ρα , ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ), by
Assumption 1 α players are indierent between actions, and so are best responding.is es-
tablishes that Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0, 1} is a sucient condition for α players to be best responding.
For β players, 1.3.2 is the indierence condition, and so every action is a best reply.
For example, consider the special case in which utility is given by thematching subgame,
4is assumption ismostly for notational convenience, the following statements continue to hold formore
general probability distributions, but only on the support of µ.
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example 3. Let ρβ ↦ g(ρβ) be any mapping into [0, 1] satisfying
Fρβ(g(ρβ)) ∈ ( 13 , 23)∀ρβ ∈ [0, 1], (1.3.3)
where Fρβ is the cumulative distribution function of themarginal distribution of ρ˜α for some
xed value of ρβ. Proposition 3 characterizes equilibria in which α players choose 1 if ρα ≥
g(ρβ), and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 4. Say α’s play according to
Aα(ρα , ρβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ρα ≥ g(ρβ)
0 ρα < g(ρβ), (1.3.4)
and β’s play according to
Aβ(ρβ) = 2 − 3Fρβ(g(ρβ)). (1.3.5)
en under the matching specication of utility, (1.3.1), ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ is an equilibrium.
Proof. e proof proceeds by showing that (1.3.5) solves the indierence condition (1.3.2), it
then follows from Proposition 3 that ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ is an equilibrium, since by construction, Aα
satises Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρβ), 1}∀ρα , ρβ ∈ [0, 1]2.
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g(ρβ)
ρβ
ρα
1
1
Aα = 1
Aα = 0 Aβ(ρβ)
ρβ1
1
Figure 1.2: Construction of simple static equilibria.
On the le: α players coordinate using the (arbitrary) boundary (ρβ , g(ρβ)). On the right: In equilibrium, β
players are more likely to choose action 1 when they believe α players are more likely to choose that action.
To that end, note that by construction of the α player’s strategy, (1.3.4), we have
Pµ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρβ) = Fρβ(g(ρβ))
Pµ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρβ) = 1 − Fρβ(g(ρβ)).
e indierence condition then becomes
Fρβ(g(ρβ))( 12 − Aβ(ρβ)) = (1 − Fρβ(g(ρβ)))( 11 + Aβ(ρβ)) ,
solving yields (1.3.5), which is a well-dened strategy only when condition 1.3.3 is satised,
which, by assumption, it is. (When Fρβ(g(ρβ)) ∉ ( 13 , 23), β players strictly prefer one or the
other action, which, by Lemma 2, cannot be an equilibrium.)
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is equilibrium is one in which the αs have exclusive access to some hidden ‘sunspot’,
which allows them to coordinate on an action, represented by the value of ρα. (Since ρβ only
ever takes one value, the β-type players have access to no private information.) For example,
imagine that ρβ represents broadcast television, while ρα represents cable television, and
people who can aord to watch cable television would like to choose the same action as
other people who can aord to watch cable television.e model suggests they can do so by
coordinating on the information they see through cable television. In equilibrium, β players
are aware that this coordination is taking place, andmust draw inferences aboutwhich action
α players are coordinating on.
e function g(ρβ) determines how likely it is that α players will choose action a = 1.
e lower is g(ρβ), the greater the probability that, conditional on ρβ, the α players are
coordinating on action a = 1.e β players equilibrium strategy, (1.3.5), is also decreasing in
g(ρβ). In this sense, β players aremimicking α players, but the degree to which this occurs is
driven by β players beliefs about the extent to which other β players are choosing an action.
What are the expected payos to players under the strategy prole described in Propo-
sition 4? Let Vα and Vβ denote the ex-ante expected payos to each type of player, i.e.,
Vα ∶= Eµ[Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β)U(1,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))
+ (1 − Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β))U(0,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))]
Vβ ∶= Eµ[Aβ(ρ˜β)U(1,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))
+ (1 − Aβ(ρ˜β))U(0,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))].
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en α players can do well, as summarized in the following result:
Proposition 5. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ be any equilibrium in which Aα is determined by (1.3.4) for some
boundary g.en
Vα = 2Vβ ,
and under the matching specication of utility, (1.3.1), Vα = 23 and Vβ = 13 .
Proof. e full proof is in Appendix A.1; here I present an intuitive proof. By construction, β
players are indierent between strategies, by construction, hence, a β playerwho randomizes
50/50 between actions receives the same payo ex-ante as in equilibrium. Half the time, such
a player chooses the same action as an α player and receives Vα, half the time he does not
and receives a payo of zero, therefore,
Vβ = 12Vα .
When payos are induced by the matching subgame, (1.3.1), the payo to a player is the ex-
pected probability that the player is an α, conditional onhis action, so, the ex-anteprobability
that a player is an α should equal the expected payo of players, and since the probability
that a player is an α player is 12 ,
1
2
= 1
2
Vα + 12Vβ = Vβ + 12Vβ = 32Vβ ,
30
so Vβ = 13 and Vα = 23 .
Surprisingly, the payo to an α player in equilibrium is independent of the strategy Aα,
as long as Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0, 1}. In the next section, I augment the model so that state variable
evolves and is allowed to depend on past actions, in such a way so that over time β players
can eventually learn which action α players are coordinating on. Do the features of the static
game carry over into the dynamic environment? In sections 1.4.1 and 1.5 I show that they do:
α players can still condition on their private information, and can extract the same payos in
the dynamic game that they do in the static game. I show that this occurs when behavior is
cyclical— in order to extract the same payos, α players need to periodically switch between
actions. Furthermore, I show how the dynamic structure of the game induces particular
forms for g(ρβ), µ, and the β’s strategy; I give intepretations of these forms and analyze
comparative statics.
1.4 Dynamic game
Now, time is continuous, t ∈ [0,∞). In each instant t, a continuum of short-lived players
play the static game.e state space is still the unit square, [0, 1]2, but elements of the state
space are now denoted ρt = (ρtα , ρtβ), to represent the dependence on time. I maintain the
assumption that both αs and βs observe the value of ρtβ, but that only αs observe ρtα. Again,
imagine that ρtβ represents a source of information available to everyone in the game, such
broadcast television, while ρtα represents a source of information available only to a subset
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of the population, such as cable television.
e game proceeds as follows. First, an initial condition is drawn from µ0 ∈ ∆[0, 1]2.
I denote the random variable by ρ˜, and ρ0 is the realized initial condition. Given an ini-
tial condition ρ0, the game outcome path is action paths atα(ρ0), atβ(ρ0) and state paths
ρtα(ρ0), ρtβ(ρ0) for t ∈ [0,∞), where, analogously to the static game, atα and atβ are the
fractions of α and β players choosing action a = 1 at time t. For convenience, the de-
pendence on the (stochastic) initial conditions will be omitted where it is clear, so that
the (stochastic) value of the outcome path at time t is denoted (a˜tα , a˜tβ , ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) to represent
(atα(ρ˜0α , ρ˜0β), atβ(ρ˜0α , ρ˜0β), ρtα(ρ˜0α , ρ˜0β), ρtβ(ρ˜0α , ρ˜0β)).
It will be of interest to consider two special sorts of outcome paths. A point ρ∗ is a xed
point under ρt if
ρt(ρ∗) = ρ∗∀t ∈ [0,∞).
A point ρ∗ is a periodic point if there exists P > 0 such that
ρP(ρ∗) = ρ∗,
and the minimum such P is called the period.e set of states traced out by the state path is
called the orbit. An orbit is called xed if it consists of a single xed point, and periodic if it
consists entirely of periodic points with some period P > 0.
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Information structure
We would now like to impose a dynamic structure on the game to capture the idea that ρt is
somehow representative of actions taken in the past. To do so, I now impose the following
interpretation on the meaning of ρt . When players make an action choice, I assume that
the choice (but not the player’s type, or the time at which they chose the action) is visible
for some time aerward. Although a player’s type is not known, I assume one type’s action
choices may be more visible than others. Imagine, for example, that once a player chooses
which style of clothing to wear, they wear it for some stochastic, exogenous amount of time
before replacing it, at which point their choice is no longer visible.5e value of ρtα represents
the fraction of players observed to be ‘wearing’ a = 1 at some location where the replacement
rate of old clothing is higher than at some other location, represented by ρtβ. I assume that old
action choices disappear at some exogenous Poisson rate rα and rβ, respectively. Formally,
the change in the fraction of players observed to have been choosing a = 1, for small time
increments, evolves approximately according to
ρt+εα ≈ (1 − εrα)ρtα + εrα(λαatα + λβrtβ)
ρt+εβ ≈ (1 − εrβ)ρtβ + εrβ(λαatα + λβrtβ).
5When the player replaces his clothing, we could imagine that he returns to the game and makes a new
purchase decision, but ‘forgets’ how long it has been since the prior purchase decision.is is consistent with
a focus on stationary equilibria in which a player’s beliefs are independent of calendar time.
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Here, λαatα + λβatβ is some average of the actions being taken by each player type. λα and
λβ are intratemporal weights, parameterizing how visible a particular player type’s action
choices are. Accordingly, we take λα + λβ = 1 and λα , λβ > 0. When λα is large, ρtα and ρtβ
mostly reect the actions of high types, conversely, when λβ is large, ρtα and ρtβ mostly reect
the actions of low types.
While λα and λβ are interpreted as intratemporal weights, rα and rβ are intertemporal
weights, adjusting how rapidly it is that old actions disappear. Consistent with the interpre-
tation above, I assume that rα > rβ > 0, so that ρtα represents a more ‘up-to-date’ average of
the actions being taken.
In the limit as ε → 0, we derive
ρ˙tα = rα(λαatα + λβatβ − ρtα) (1.4.1)
ρ˙tβ = rβ(λαatα + λβatβ − ρtβ)., (1.4.2)
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the laws of motion of ρ⃗t .6 A solution to (1.4.1) and (1.4.1) is
ρtα = e−rα tρ0α + rα ∫ t
0
e−rα(τ−t)(λαaτα + λβaτβ) dτ (1.4.3)
ρtβ = e−rβ tρ0β + rβ ∫ t0 e−rβ(τ−t)(λαaτα + λβaτβ) dτ, (1.4.4)
which makes explicit the fact that we assume that ρ⃗t is an exponentially-weighted moving
average of past actions, with weights rα and rβ, up to ρ0, the initial condition.78
is specication of ρ⃗t captures the idea that players have some information about the
actions of other players, but that this information is delayed, and does not immediately re-
ect changes in action choices. e assumption that rα > rβ captures the idea that the αs
have access to more up-to-date information than βs, since a higher value for rα places more
weight on more recent actions.9
6More generally, we might specify that (ρ tα , ρ tβ) evolve according to some law of motion which depends
on the action prole,
s˙ tα = fα(ρ tα , a tα , a tβ)
s˙ tβ = fβ(ρ tβ , a tα , a tβ),
in which case fα(ρα , aα , aβ) = rα(ρα − λαaα − λβaβ), fβ(ρβ , aα , aβ) = rβ(ρβ − λαaα − λβaβ) corresponds
to an exponentially weighted moving average; the assumption that ρα , ρβ are exponentially weighted moving
averages is tractable and has a simple interpretation compared to the general case.
7ere is some ambiguity as to the meaning of a solution to a discontinuous dierential equation,
which (1.4.1), (1.4.2) may be. Here, I mean a Carathéodory solution, that is, the solution should satisfy
s t = ∫ t
0
s˙τ dτ + s0 .
8An alternate way to have set up the model would been to have had time begin at −∞, which motivates
an interpretation of ρ0α , ρ0β as representing, in some reduced-form way, the state of the system at time 0.
9An exponentially weighted moving average is, of course, simply one out of many which we could have
chosen. Wemight instead consider a moving window, or, a number which updates only intermittently accord-
ing to some Poisson process. In Appendix ??, I show by example that similar results may be obtained under
these two alternatives, but in a less tractable way.
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Strategies
A strategy prole is now functions mapping calendar time and the observed state variable
into the probability of choosing action a = 1, denoted Atα(ρα , ρβ),Atβ(ρβ). A strategy is
stationarymeans it is independent of calendar time, Atα = Aα ,Atβ = Aβ∀t ∈ [0,∞).
A strategy prole ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩, induces an action path through—analogously to the static
setting—the conditions
atα = Atα(ρtα , ρtβ) (1.4.5)
atβ = Atβ(ρtβ)∀t ∈ [0,∞) (1.4.6)
from the lawof large numbers; it induces a state path through the laws ofmotion (1.4.3), (1.4.4).10
Payos
For a xed outcome path, the payos to a player in period t are the same as in the static game,
that is, if a player chooses action a at time t, his payo is U(a, atα , atβ), satisfying Assump-
tion 1. A player who sees private information s updates his beliefs over initial conditions, as
10Outcome paths satisfying (1.4.5), (1.4.6), (1.4.3), and (1.4.4) are neither guaranteed to exist, nor to be
unique. In the case where an outcome path does not exist, as may occur, for example, if Aα or Aβ are not
measurable functions, then payos may be assumed to be −∞, but we will not consider equilibria with this
property. In the case where the outcome path is not unique, one may be selected according to any arbitrary
rule. For example, we might select one consistent with a discrete-time approximation to the model. Since any
individual player’s deviations do not aect the outcome path, the precise rule selected is unimportant. For the
remainder of this paper, all strategies are implicitly taken to be measurable functions, so that (1.4.3), (1.4.4) are
well-dened, and each strategy prole is considered to induce to a unique outcome path. Lemma 9 character-
izes the way in which there may bemultiple outcome paths, briey, an outcome path’s orbit may contain both a
xed point and a periodic point, however, behavior on the outcome path is still consistent with the equilibrium
characterizations derived in this paper.
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previously noted, for every initial condition there is a unique outcome path, hence, beliefs
over initial conditions induce beliefs over the value of the outcome path at every time t. I
denote random variables with tildes and realizations without tildes.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a strategy prole and beliefs over the state variable at each time
t, denoted ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩, such that players are best responding to their beliefs, and beliefs are
consistent with the outcome path induced by ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩.
Formally, players are best responding given beliefs when (note that the expectation op-
erator is omitted for α players, since their belief updating process is trivial)
Supp(Atα(ρtα , ρtβ)) ⊆ argmax
a∈{0,1} U(a, atα , atβ) (1.4.7)
Supp(Atβ(ρtβ)) ⊆ argmax
a∈{0,1} Eµt[U(a, a˜tα , a˜tβ) ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ]∀t ∈ [0,∞) (1.4.8)
and beliefs are consistent with equilibrium behavior when, for all measurable subsets S ⊂
[0, 1]2,
µ0(S) = µt(ρtα(S), ρtβ(S))∀t ∈ [0,∞). (1.4.9)
An equilibrium is stationary means the strategy prole and beliefs are stationary, so that
Atα = Aα ,Atβ = Aβ, and µt = µ∀t ∈ [0,∞). Stationarity does not imply stationarity of the
state path, just that players beliefs should be independent of the time they entered the game.
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1.4.1 Equilibria of the dynamic game
I formally state a characterization of stationary equilibria in this game and discuss its impli-
cations.e full proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 6. Let ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩, be an equilibrium.en, for all t,
1. Atα satises
Atα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) ∈ {0,Atβ(ρ˜β), 1} and (1.4.10)
2. Atβ(ρβ) solves
Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 0 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ) × (U(0, 0,Atβ(ρβ)) −U(1, 0,Atβ(ρβ)))
= Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 1 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ) × (U(1, 1,Atβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Atβ(ρβ))) (1.4.11)
Furthermore, these conditions are sucient for equilibria, in the following sense: Let ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩
be a strategy prole, and say µt are probability distributions over [0, 1]2 consistent with the
outcome path induced by ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩. If for all t ∈ [0,∞), ρα , ρβ ∈ Supp(µt), it is the case that
Aα(ρα , ρβ) satises (1.4.10) and Aβ(ρβ) satises (1.4.11), then ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩, is an equilibrium.
Proposition 6 is simply a re-statement of Lemmas 1 and 2, from the static environment in
the dynamic environment. If we require equilibria to be stationary, we can derive stronger
results than Proposition 6:
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Proposition 7. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩, µ be a stationary equilibrium. en, for all ρ⃗ ∈ Supp(µ), Aα
satises (1.4.10), Aβ solves
∣λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ∣ × (U(0, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(1, 0,Aβ(ρβ)))
= ∣λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ∣ × (U(1, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ))) (1.4.12)
almost surely, and λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ≥ 0 and λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ≤ 0.
Furthermore, these conditions are sucient for equilibria, in the following sense: Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩
be a stationary strategy prole. If for all ρ⃗ ∈ [0, 1]2, it is the case that Aα(ρα , ρβ) satises (1.4.10)
and Aβ(ρβ) satises (1.4.12), then there exists a probability measure µ on [0, 1]2 such that
⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩, is a stationary equilibrium.
Propositions 6 and 7 look similar, and so it is worthwhile to consider their dierences.
Proposition 6 is the dynamic version of Proposition 3, and the proof is similar. In Propo-
sition 3, µ was taken to be exogenous. Proposition 6 has nothing further to say about µt
beyond the equilibrium requirement that it be consistent with player’s behavior. For sta-
tionary equilibria, however, it is possible to say more about µ. Specically, the marginal
distributions Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 0 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ) and Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 1 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ) may be
characterized, which yields (1.4.12), and furthermore, given strategy proles ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ satis-
fying (1.4.10) and (1.4.12), Proposition 7 states that consistent equilibrium beliefs exist, while
Proposition 6 has nothing to say about the existence of consistent beliefs for a given strategy
prole.
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A focus on stationary equilibria is oen justied through an argument that they repre-
sent, in some way, the long-run of a non-stationary equilibrium of the game. Since I mainly
focus on stationary equilibria for the rest of the paper, in Appendix A.2 I show via numer-
ical simulation that it is not unusual for non-stationary equilibrium behavior to result in
convergence to a stationary equilibrium.
1.4.2 Instrumental preferences for conformity
Under the matching specication of utility, it is possible to explicitly characterize equilib-
rium strategy proles in stationary equilibria for β players by applying (1.4.12) from Propo-
sition 7:
Example 4 (Matching utility I cont.). Here,
U(a, aα , aβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
aα
aα+aβ a = 1
1−aα
1−aα+1−aβ a = 0,
when aα ≠ 0 or aβ ≠ 0, and 0 if aα = aβ = 0.en equation (1.4.12) becomes
rβ(ρβ − λβAβ(ρβ))× 11 + (1 − Aβ(ρβ)) = rβ(ρβ − λα − λβAβ(ρβ))× 11 + Aβ(ρβ) , (1.4.13)
Solving yields
Aβ(ρβ) = ρβ . (1.4.14)
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at is, under thematching specication of utility, β playersmimic the actions they see have
been taken in the past. It is not clear ex-ante that β players should display this behavior, aer
all, they do not have direct preferences for conformity, in the sense that their payos are not
necessarily increasing in the number of other players choosing the same action. Is this a general
feature of the model, or is it specic to the matching specication of utility? In this section, I
argue that it is a general feature of the model, in the sense that β players are more likely to
take an action the more they see that other players have chosen that action in the past, in every
stationary equilibrium.
An interpretation of equation (1.4.14) is that the β players are ‘endogenously’ conformist.
eir strategy could be interpreted as the players sampling an action from the social network
represented by ρβ, and mimicking it. In fact, this induced preference for conformity is a
feature of the general model:
Proposition 8 (Instrumental preferences for conformity). Say ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ is a stationary
equilibrium. If ρβ , ρ′β are two draws from ρ˜β and ρ′β > ρβ, then with probability 1, Aβ(ρ′β) ≥
Aβ(ρβ).
Proof. Pick ρβ , ρ′β ∈ projβ(Supp(µ)). If ρ′β = ρβ, then Aβ(ρβ) = Aβ(ρ′β). So say ρ′β > ρβ, but
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Aβ(ρ′β) < Aβ(ρβ).en, by Assumption 1, we have
U(1, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) < U(1, 1,Aβ(ρ′β))
U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) > U(0, 1,Aβ(ρ′β))
U(0, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) > U(0, 0,Aβ(ρ′β))
U(1, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) < U(1, 0,Aβ(ρ′β)),
and so
U(0, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(1, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) > U(0, 0,Aβ(ρ′β)) −U(1, 0,Aβ(ρ′β)) (1.4.15)
U(1, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) < U(1, 1,Aβ(ρ′β)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρ′β)). (1.4.16)
On the other hand, (recall by Proposition 7 that λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ≤ 0, λβAβ(ρ′β) − ρβ ≤ 0):
∣λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ∣ ≤ ∣λα + λβAβ(ρ′β) − ρβ∣ (1.4.17)
∣λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ∣ ≥ ∣λβAβ(ρ′β) − ρβ)∣ . (1.4.18)
Together, (1.4.15), (1.4.16), (1.4.17), and (1.4.18) contradict (1.4.12), which holds with proba-
bility 1, and so it must be with probability 1 that Aβ(ρ′β) ≥ Aβ(ρβ), the desired result.
at is, with two independent draws from ρ˜β, it is almost certain that the β players will
be more likely to choose a = 1 when the draw is higher. Proposition 8 is of interest because,
as in Bernheim (1994), observed conformist behavior does not arise from a direct preference
42
for conformity, rather, it arises from strategic incentives on the part of players to appear to
have better information about the actions of other players. It provides a rational for why
we might observe aesthetic preferences for conformity, and furthermore, why preferences
for conformity might be viewed negatively by others, or associated with lower-class tastes
(Bourdieu, 1984).
1.5 Matching game application
In this section, I apply Proposition 7 to explicitly compute equilibria in the casewhere payos
are determined by the matching subgame, as in example 3. Imagine that player’s action
choices are interpreted as a choice between locations (for example, a = 0 represents a bar on
the east side of town, and a = 1 represents a bar on the west side of town). Once players have
made the action choice, they travel to the location, and look for someone to match with.
Matching with an α results in a payo of 1, and matching with a β results in a payo of 0.
Say in addition that instead of unit masses of both sorts of players, there is a mass Mα of α
players andMβ of β players.e payo of a player who chooses action a is therefore derived
using Bayes’ rule as
U(a, aα , aβ) = P(Meeting an α ∣ Choosing a)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mαaα
Mαaα+Mβaβ a = 1
Mα(1−aα)
Mα(1−aα)+Mβ(1−aβ) a = 0.
(1.5.1)
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When aα = aβ = 0, or aα = aβ = 1, (1.5.1) is not well-dened when a = 1 or a = 0, say in this
case that U(1, 0, 0) = U(0, 1, 1) = MαMα+Mβ , so that U satises Assumption 1.
ere are many stationary equilibria of this game. By Lemma 9, in Appendix A.1, it is
sucient to focus on stationary equilibria with beliefs whose support consists of a single
xed point or a single periodic orbit. Furthermore, we seek equilibria which are geometri-
cally symmetric, meaning
Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 1 − Aα(1 − ρα , ρβ)
Aβ(ρβ) = 1 − Aβ(ρβ),
(or geometrically, that strategy proles should be invariant to 180○ rotations).e restriction
to geometrically symmetric equilibria is justied for two reasons: First, it is aesthetically
pleasing; analysis of geometrically asymmetric equilibria may be done and produces similar
results. Second, among strategy proles in which α’s always coordinate on 0 or 1, there is a
unique geometrically symmetric strategy prole which produces the highest possible payo
for α players. (See Proposition 12 for a characterization of payos in this equilibrium.)
Fixed points
First, we characterize all stationary equilibria with beliefs whose support contains a xed
point. ese are all equilibria ⟨Aα ,Aβ , δ(ρ∗α ,ρ∗β)⟩, where δ(ρ∗α ,ρ∗β) is a xed point and δ is the
Dirac measure which puts probability 1 on (ρ∗α , ρ∗β).e result is summarized in the follow-
ing proposition:
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Proposition 9. ⟨Aα ,Aβ , δ(ρ∗α ,ρ∗β)⟩ is a stationary equilibrium if and only if
Aα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) = Aβ(ρ∗β) = ρ∗α = ρ∗β .
Proof. To show necessity, pick s∗ ∈ [0, 1], and say ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ is a strategy prole satisfying
Aα(s∗, s∗) = Aβ(s∗) = s∗.
I claim that ⟨Aα ,Aβ , δ(s∗ ,s∗)⟩ is a stationary equilibrium. Under this strategy prole, the state
path under the sole possible realization of the state variable is
(ρtα , ρtβ) = (s∗, s∗)∀t ≥ 0,
and by Proposition 7, ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ is a stationary equilibrium, since (1.4.10) is satised; when
s∗ ∈ (0, 1) equation (1.4.12) is satised since, e.g., Pµ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = s∗) = 0, and
when s∗ ∈ {0, 1}, (1.4.12) is satised since, e.g., U(1, 1,Aβ(s∗)) − U(0, 1,Aβ(s∗)) = 0, by
Assumption 1, so for all s∗ ∈ [0, 1], both sides of the indierence condition (1.4.12) are zero.
Hence ⟨Aα ,Aβ , δ(s∗ ,s∗)⟩ is a stationary equilibrium.
To show suciency, say ⟨Aα ,Aβ , δ(ρ∗α ,ρ∗β)⟩ is some stationary equilibrium. Note that in
equilibrium the state variable is commonly known, hence, for β players to be indierent we
must have Aα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) = Aβ(ρ∗β). And by the law of motion (1.4.3), for (ρ∗α , ρ∗β) to be a xed
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point, we must have
0 = rα(λαAα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) + λβAβ(ρ∗β) − ρ∗β)
= rα(Aβ(ρ∗β) − ρ∗β)
Ô⇒ Aβ(ρ∗β) = ρ∗β .
Applying (1.4.4) and similar reasoning yields Aβ(ρ∗β) = ρ∗α , so Aα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) = Aβ(ρ∗β) = ρ∗α =
ρ∗β , which is the desired result.
Periodic orbits
Now, in the more interesting case, we characterize all stationary equilibria with periodic
orbits. To do so, we begin by solving condition (1.4.12), which when Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0, 1}
becomes
(λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ) ×Mα/(Mα +Mβ(1 − aβ))
= −(λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ) ×Mα/(Mα +MβAβ(ρβ)),
to obtain the functional form Aβ(ρβ)must satisfy at all possible ρβ in the support of µ.e
result is summarized in Lemma 3:
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Lemma 3. Under the matching specication of utility, (1.5.1), if Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0, 1}, and
Aβ(ρβ) = (2MαMβ + 1)ρβ − MαMβ λα2MαMβ λβ + 1 . (1.5.2)
for all (ρα , ρβ), then there exists a probability measure µ such that ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ is a stationary
equilibrium.
(1.5.2) may not result in a well-dened strategy prole on the entire state space (specif-
ically, it may specify that Aβ(ρβ) ∉ [0, 1] at some ρβ), hence, by Proposition 7, wherever
this occurs we must have Aα(ρα , ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ). Finding stationary equilibria with periodic
orbits is then a matter of choosing regions on which Aα = 1 and Aα = 0, solving (1.5.2)
on the regions where it implies Aβ(ρβ) ∈ [0, 1], and choosing Aα(ρα , ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ) on
regions where (1.5.2) requires Aβ(ρβ) ∉ [0, 1]. Together with (1.5.2) and the laws of mo-
tion (1.4.3), (1.4.4), this induces a dynamical system on the state space. Solving for a time
average then yields µ. More specically,
1. Guess an initial starting point, (ρ0α , ρ0β), and begin with Aα = 1.
2. Solve forward the dierential equation resulting from (1.5.2), the laws ofmotion (1.4.3),
(1.4.4), and the assumption that Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 1,
s˙tα = rα ⎛⎝λα + λβ ⎛⎝(2
Mα
Mβ
+ 1)ρtβ − MαMβ λα
2MαMβ λβ + 1 ⎞⎠ − ρtα⎞⎠ (1.5.3)
s˙tβ = rβ ⎛⎝λα + λβ ⎛⎝(2
Mα
Mβ
+ 1)ρtβ − MαMβ λα
2MαMβ λβ + 1 ⎞⎠ − ρtβ⎞⎠ (1.5.4)
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on some time interval, [0, P0), to yield (ρtα , ρtβ) on t ∈ [0, P0).
3. At t = P0, take the point (ρP0α , ρP0β ) as an initial condition, and repeat the process, but
now with Aα = 0, to yield (ρtα , ρtβ) on [P0, P1).
4. Check whether the stationarity condition, (ρP1α , ρP1β ) = (ρ0α , ρ0β) is satised, if it is, then
a stationary equilibrium has been found, with period P0 + P1, in which α players play
a strategy satisfying
Aα(ρα , ρβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 (ρα , ρβ) ∈ {(ρtα , ρtβ) ∣ t ∈ [0, P0)}
0 (ρα , ρβ) ∈ {(ρtα , ρtβ) ∣ t ∈ [P0, P1)},
and β players play according to (1.5.2).
For example, in the special case in which Mα = Mβ = λα = λβ = 12 , we might look
for a geometrically symmetric equilibrium by xing an initial starting value ρ0β < 12 , and
guessing ρ0α as the corresponding value in the α dimension.e solution to the dierential
equation (1.5.4) may be obtained using standard methods as
ρtβ = e− λα rβ2λβ+1 t(ρ0β − (1 + λβ)). (1.5.5)
Substituting (1.5.5) into (1.5.3) yields an ordinary dierential equation,
s˙tα = rα ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝λα + λβ
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
(2MαMβ + 1)e− λα rβ2λβ+1 t(ρ0β − (1 + λβ)) − MαMβ λα
2MαMβ λβ + 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ − ρtα
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ (1.5.6)
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which may also be solved using standard methods. We could proceed by taking (ρP/2α , ρP/2β )
as the initial conditions and repeating this process, but by our assumption of geometric sym-
metry, this is equivalent to 1−ρ0β = ρP/2β , and 1−ρ0α = ρP/2α , which yields two stationarity condi-
tions from (1.5.5) and the solution to (1.5.6). Specically, the stationarity condition resulting
from (1.5.5) is
1 − ρ0β = e− λα rβ2λβ+1 P2 (ρ0β − (1 + λβ)),
which, solving for P, implies the period length is
P = 2(1 + 2λβ)
rβλα
log
⎛⎝1 − ρ0β + λβλβ + ρ0β ⎞⎠ .
Analogously, solving the stationarity condition 1− ρ0α = ρP/2α yields ρ0α as a function of ρ0β, the
point at which α players should switch from a = 0 to a = 1.e solution in this case is plotted
numerically in gure 1.3.e solid curve, ρswitchα (ρβ), denotes the explicit function induced
by the stationarity condition 1 − ρ0α = ρP/2α . It is the boundary at which by construction α
players switch from one action to another. By Proposition 7, any strategy at which α players
are choosing either 0 or 1 everywhere is a best reply for all α players. But the following
strategy, in which α players switch at the switching boundary,
Aswitchα (ρα , ρβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ρα ≥ ρswitchα (ρβ)
0 ρα < ρswitchα (ρβ), (1.5.7)
49
is special, since by construction, it is the only (up to zero probability events) strategy consis-
tent with all stationary beliefs. Combining this, together with Lemma 9 and Proposition 9,
yields the following characterization of stationary, geometrically symmetric equilibria:
Proposition 10. ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ is a stationary, geometrically symmetric equilibrium if and only
if
Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {Aswitchα (ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)}
almost surely, and Aβ satises (1.5.2).
Armed with Proposition 10, we now analyze some comparative statics of this equilib-
rium. Of interest is periodic behavior in the game, and the main questions I ask are the
following: What aects the period length? What aects the payos to players? And, what
aects the switching strategy for α players, Aswitchα ?
1.5.1 Comparative statics
Period length
As illustrated by gure 1.3, there are many possible period lengths in equilibrium, depend-
ing on the initial choice of ρ0β. e following result characterizes the set of possible period
lengths:
Proposition 11. In every stationary equilibrium under the matching specication of utility, the
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ρβ
Aα = 0
Aα = 1
ρs
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α
(ρ β)
ρα
ρβ
Figure 1.3: Outcome paths in stationary equilibria
Le: Two possible outcome paths under the matching specication of utility. e solid outer outcome path
has equitemporally spaced arrows to indicate speed.e inner dashed curve is another outcome path. When
the invariant measure µ is ergodic if and only if it has support only on one outcome path, and the convex hull
of all ergodic measures is the set of all nvariant measures. ρswitchα (ρβ) represents the set of points at which
α players switch in stationary equilibria, derived from the stationarity condition 1 − ρ0α = ρP/2α , hence, the
indicated strategy at which α players choose 1 when (ρα , ρβ) ≥ (ρswitchα (ρβ), ρβ) and 0 otherwise is the only
geometrically symmetric α strategy prole consistent with all geometrically symmetric invariant measures (up
to zero-probability events on the boundary of ρswitchα .) Right: Two outcome paths, with λα = λβ = Mα = Mβ =
1
2 , but rβ = 1 in one (light, green) and rβ = 1/4 in the other (dark, purple). Arrows are equitemporally spaced
to illustrate that when rβ = 1/4, the state path moves more slowly in both dimensions.
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period satises
P ≤ ( 2
rβλα
)(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log(1 + MβMα ) . (1.5.8)
Furthermore, for any P satisfying (1.5.8), there is a stationary equilibrium which induces an
outcome path with that period length.
Proof. Appendix.
A broad stylized fact about the last century is that the pace of modern life is perceived
to be faster today than it was in 1900. Today, the lifespan of fashions is measured in years,
a century ago, they might be measured in decades. On Facebook or Twitter, topics trend
and then are forgotten in the span of a week.e model suggests that what drives the speed
of fads is the up-to-dateness of information available to β players, not that available to α
players, as summarized in the following two corollaries to Proposition 11:
Corollary 1. e maximum possible period length in symmetric stationary equilibria, denoted
P∗, satises
1. ∂P
∗
∂rβ
< 0, ∂P∗
∂rα
= 0,
2. ∂P
∗
∂λα
< 0, ∂P∗
∂λβ
> 0,
Furthermore, there is a cuto rβ such that
1. ∂P
∗
∂(Mα/Mβ) < 0 when λβ < rβ and
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2. ∂P
∗
∂(Mα/Mβ) > 0 when λβ > rβ.
Corollary 1 is a statement about orderings of the set of possible period lengths. We could
also consider the following: Fix some value of ρ0β < 12 , and compare the periodic outcome
paths, for dierent parameters, but for which ρ0β is the smallest value achieved by ρtβ. (See
gure 1.3 for an illustration of two state paths derived in this way.) e same comparative
statics hold, see Corollary 2 in Appendix A.1.
Corollary 1 implies that the channel which drives the lifespan of a fad is not the infor-
mation available to the α players, but that available to the β players. An increase rβ means
the average available to β players places more weight on more recent actions, and an in-
crease in λα (which, since λα + λβ = 1, is a decrease in λβ) means the average available to β
players places more weight on actions taken by α players. Both reduce the lifespan of a fad,
for the reason that the faster β players learn the action α players are coordinating on, the
faster α players need to switch.is provides a rational for why fads are percieved to begin
more oen and end more rapidly today, if in 1900 it took days for upper-classes to learn
about a new fashion, but months for lower-classes, the model predicts that fads should have
lasted months; today, it may still take days for high-classes, but weeks for lower-classes, and
accordingly fads last weeks.
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Payos
e next result characterizes average payos in equilibrium. By average payos, I mean the
payo expected by a player ex-ante, before entering the game,
Vα ∶= Eµ[U(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β)),Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β)]
Vβ ∶= Eµ[U(Aβ(ρ˜β)),Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β)].
Proposition 12. In every symmetric, stationary equilibrium in which Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0, 1} and
Aβ(ρβ) ∈ (0, 1) on the outcome path,
Vα = MαMα + 12Mβ
Vβ = 12 MαMα + 12Mβ .
Proof. β’s are by construction indierent between actions, and so, a β player who deviates to
the strategy ‘mix 50/50 between actions’ receives the same payo as onewhomixes according
to Aβ(ρβ). Such a player, by chance, chooses the α-type player’s actions half the time, and
so
Vβ = 12Vα . (1.5.9)
When α players are coordinating on a = 0 or a = 1, their payo is the probability that a
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randomly chosen player choosing that action is an α player in equilibrium. Since α players
always choose either a = 1 or a = 0, consistency of beliefs requires that the average (uncon-
ditional) payo of any player in the game be equal to the probability that an average player
is an α, that is
Mα
Mα +Mβ Vα + MβMα +Mβ Vβ = MαMα +Mβ ,
which, re-arranging, implies
Mβ
Mα
Vβ = 1 − Vα . (1.5.10)
Combining (1.5.9) and (1.5.10) and solving for Vα ,Vβ yields the desired result.
Proposition 12 implies that the payos to the dierent player types are independent of all
model parameters except for the relative mass of α and β players in the population. In par-
ticular, it is independent of the timeliness of the β-type player’s information, rβ. Intuitively,
this occurs because improving the quality of β-type player’s information has two eects:e
rst is that β players learn faster, and the second, from Corollary 1, is that α players switch
more rapidly between actions. Here, the two eects exactly cancel.is result suggests that
informing β players about what other players are doing may not have the intended eect.
Imagine for example advising a high school student to go to college in order to maximize
her earnings, and that going to college increases earnings only because it communicates that
the recipient of a diploma is the sort of person who understands that the sort of thing one
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does to increase earnings is go to college.11 en, advising one or two high school students
to go to college will benet them, but making it commonly known that one should attend
college to maximize earnings will result in employers seeking some other signal.
Strength of conformity
In Section 1.4.1 the concept of instrumental preferences for conformity in this model was
introduced. We proved that β players were more likely to choose an action the more they’d
seen that action chosen in the past. How much more likely they are to choose that action
depends onmodel parameters, I interpret this as the degree of β player’s conformity and call
it κ, i.e.
κ ∶= ∂
∂ρβ
Aβ(ρβ).
e following result summarizes the comparative statics of the strength of conformity:
Proposition 13. β players are more conformist when there are more α’s, and when α’s are more
visible, i.e.,
1. ∂κ
∂(Mα/Mβ) > 0,
2. ∂κ
∂λα
> 0.
11is is valuable to employers if, for example, understanding that one should go to college is indicative of
a high-class backround, or signals that an individual understands the other sorts of things that one should do
to be successful in a career, or will be a good cultural t in a particular job.
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Proof. e proof follows from straightforward calculation, since from (1.5.2),
κ = 2(Mα/Mβ) + 1
2(Mα/Mβ)λβ + 1 .
Conditional on observing, e.g., a high value of ρβ, a β player tends to think it is more
likely that many β players are choosing a = 1, since the periods of time in which lots of both
types of players are pooling on a single action last longer than the periods of time when
αs are choosing a dierent action than everyone else (see gure 1.3 for an illustration). An
increase in the visibility of α players increases the degree to which β’s are conformist because
it reduces the length of the initial adoption period, in which α’s are mainly choosing one
action and β’s mainly choosing another, hence, when λα is larger, conditional on observing
a high value of ρβ, a β type player believes it more likely that everyone, α’s and β’s alike, is
pooling on a = 1, and so more β’s must in equilibrium choose a = 1.
α strategies and anti-conformity
What determines the switching boundary, ρswitchα (ρβ)? In particular, we are interested in the
average slope of the switching boundary for some point (ρβ , ρswitchα (ρβ)) in the orbit of the
state path, as well as an interpretation of its slope. Specically, consider the following linear
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strategy α’s might play for some xed slope, γ > 0 (see gure 1.4 for an illustration.)
Aα(ρα , ρβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ρα − 12 ≥ γ(ρβ − 12)
0 ρα − 12 < γ(ρβ − 12),
(1.5.11)
If we x some value of ρβ < 1/2, then the linear strategy in which the switching boundary
passes through the points (ρswitchα (ρβ), ρβ), (1 − ρswitchα (ρβ), 1 − ρβ) supports an equilibrium
with a state path passing through those points, by Proposition 10, so that
γ = 1 − 2ρβ
1 − 2ρswitchα (ρβ) . (1.5.12)
How to interpret γ? In gure 1.5 is plotted ρtα , ρtβ, for a xed starting value, as a function
of time.e α’s strategy while playing a = 1, as a function of time, can be divided into three
periods. In the rst, P1, the α’s coordinate on the action which appears to be a minority
action, i.e., ρtα < 12 and ρtβ < 12 . During this initial, very few β players are choosing action
a = 1, and the payo to the α players is high. In the second period, P2, the α’s coordinate on
an actionwhich appears to be themajority action, since ρα > 12 , but which is still percieved as
the minority action by ρβ. Since Aβ( 12) = 12 in every geometrically symmetric equilibrium,
this is also a period of time during which the minority of β players are choosing the action.
In the nal period, P3, majorities of both α and β players are coordinating on action a = 1.
e switching point is determined as the point where the ratio of ρβ to ρα is suciently
high, that is, a = 1 is percieved by α players to have ‘played out’ as a trend. ‘Suciently high’
58
ρα
ρβ
Aα = 0
Aα = 1
ρα
ρβ
Figure 1.4: Stationary equilibria and their corresponding linear strategies
Le: Each outcome path in a geometrically symmetric equilibrium is supported by a corresponding linear
strategy. Right: Moving from high rβ (light, green) to low rβ (dark, purple) decreases the slope of the linear
switching boundary.
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is measured by γ. So, γ may be interpreted as the degree to which α players are willing to
wait before choosing the minority action. We interpreted the slope of the β’s strategy, κ, as
measuring the degree to which they mimicked the actions being taken by others, that is, the
degree to which β players appeared to be conformist; analogously, we might interpret γ as
measuring the degree to which α players anti-conform, a higher value of γ corresponds to
α players appearing to be less willing to anti-conform. Under the interpretation of ρα , ρβ
as Facebook and Instagram, intuitively, an α player decides to anti-conform and choose
a = 0 when it appears that the number of people choosing a = 1 on Facebook is large and
suciently close to the number of people choosing a = 0 on Instagram, and γ measures the
threshold at which the switch occurs.
Proposition 14. In every equilibrium strategy of the form (1.5.11), γ < 1. Furthermore, γ satis-
fying (1.5.12) is increasing in rα, and decreasing in rβ.
Proof. e proof follows by substituting the analytical expression for ρswitchα (ρβ) derived pre-
viously into the expression for γ, (1.5.12). It is then a straightforward comparative statics
exercise to establish the result.
Proposition 14 suggests that improving the information technology available to β play-
ers, or increasing rβ, increases the degree to which α players are anti-conformist. Intu-
itively, when β players learn what action players are coordinating on more quickly, α’s not
only switch more rapidly, as established in Proposition 1, but they also act as if more anti-
conformist.
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Figure 1.5: Outcome paths as a function of time
Top: One period of ρα , ρβ as functions of time when Aα = Aswitchα .e α’s strategy, as a function of time, can
be divided into three periods. In the rst, P1, the α’s coordinate on the action which appears to be a minority
action, a = 1. During this initial, very few β players are choosing action a = 1, and the payo to these α
players is high. In the second period, P2, the α’s coordinate on an action which appears to be the majority
action, according to ρα , but which is still percieved as the minority action by ρβ . Since Aβ( 12 ) = 12 in every
geometrically symmetric equilibrium, this is also a period of time during which the minority of β players are
choosing the action. In the nal period, P3, majorities of both α and β players are coordinating on action a = 1.
e switching point is determined as the point where the ratio of ρβ to ρα is suciently high, that is, a = 1
is percieved by α players to have ‘played out’ as a trend. e cycle then repeats. Bottom: e case in which
rα < rβ is a case in which α’s anti-conform when they percieve everyone has been taking the newer action, and
they coordinate on the action which appears relatively older.
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1.6 Extensions
So far in this paper, α players have diered from β players in three distinct ways: First,
they observe strictly more information than β players. Second, they have access to a more
up-to-date average of the actions of past players, since rα > rβ. And third, all players have
preferences for matching the actions of α players, and mismatching the actions of β players.
In this section, we consider the dierent cases, summarized in table ??.
rα > rβ rα < rβ
α’s valued Main paper ‘Hipsters’
β’s valued Only xed points Only xed points
Table 1.1:ree possible additional cases considered in Section 1.6.
In this section, I consider the following extensions to the model: First, I consider what
happens if β players are the type who are valued, that is, I relax the assumptions on the utility
function and allow U(1, aα , aβ) to instead be increasing in aβ and decreasing in aα. I show
that only xed-point equilibria are possible in this setting. Second, I consider what happens
if rα < rβ, that is, α players have access to older information about the past actions of players.
I show that periodic equilibria may still be supported, but that α player’s strategies nowmay
be interpreted as choosing actions which seem relatively older.
1.6.1 β players are valued
e case in which β players are the ones who are valued corresponds to the following mod-
ication to Assumption 1:
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Assumption 2. U(1, aα , aβ) < U(0, aα , aβ) if and only if aα > aβ.
en the following result is straightforward:
Proposition 15. Under Assumption 2, in every stationary equilibrium, Aα(ρα , ρβ) = Aβ(ρβ).
Proof. Say there were some state (ρα , ρβ) ∈ Supp(µ) for which Aα(ρα , ρβ) > Aβ(ρβ). (e
case in which the inequality is ipped is analogous.)en by Assumption 1,
U(0,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)) > U(1,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)),
and so Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 0. But since Aβ(ρβ) ≥ 0, we have Aβ(ρβ) ≥ Aα(ρα , ρβ), a contradiction.
Proposition 15 implies that the sorts of dynamics which occurred under Assumption 1
cannot occur if β-type players are the valued players. Players may all pool on an action
(Aα = Aβ = 0), or they may randomize independently of what other players are doing. In-
tuitively, imagine an academic environment, in which appearing to be well-informed about
what other academics are wearing is a signal, perhaps, that one pays insucient attention to
one’s research. e academics who do pay attention to what others are wearing are always
capable of mimicking the dress of those who do not, and so in equilibrium a wide range of
dress styles are acceptable and no inferences are drawn from one’s clothing. Or, imagine an
oce environment, where a similar dynamic may be at play, and where all workers coordi-
nate on a uniform dress code, because standing out is frowned upon as a signal that one is
insuciently serious about the job.
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1.6.2 rα < rβ
e case in which α players have access to older information than β players about what other
players are choosing corresponds to the case in whcih rα < rβ. In this case, I assert without
proof that Proposition 7 continues to hold,12 and as before, we may construct the switching
boundary, ρswitchα (ρβ). Now, however, the α’s switch the actions they play (compare to (1.5.7)):
Aswitchα (ρα , ρβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 ρα ≥ ρswitchα (ρβ)
1 ρα < ρswitchα (ρβ). (1.6.1)
As before, we can dene the average slope of the switching boundary, γ, as in (1.5.12), and
the linear strategy, analogous to (1.5.11):
Aα(ρα , ρβ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ρα − 12 < γ(ρβ − 12)
0 ρα − 12 ≥ γ(ρβ − 12).
(1.6.2)
How to interpret γ now, when rα < rβ? When rα > rβ, the α players coordinated on
actions which seemed recently more popular, until they saw that enough players had been
coordinating on that action recently, in which case they switched to choose the action which
appeared to be a minority action, but which also appeared to be relatively recently more
popular. When rα < rβ, the α’s have access to relatively older information than β players
12e proof is the same, with minor modications.
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about the actions of other players, and so they switch to the minority action, they choose
the action which appears to be relatively older in popularity (see gure 1.5), and we have the
following modication of Proposition 14 with an analogous proof:
Proposition 16. In every equilibrium strategy of the form (1.5.11), γ > 1. Furthermore, γ satis-
fying (1.5.12) is decreasing in rα, and increasing in rβ.
Since in this case α players coordinate on the actions which seem relatively older and
less popular, we might interpret this as the case of ‘hipsters’, while the case in which rα > rβ
was the case of ‘fashion leaders’.
1.7 Conclusion
I conclude with a discussion of future avenues for research, as well as miscellaneous topics
unsuitable for the main body of the paper.
In the United States, when high school students apply to prestigious colleges, admissions
committees generally discriminate between students, whomay almost universally have per-
fect test scores, on the basis of ‘holistic’ factors. In practice, they tend to look at whether a
student engaged in particular extra-curricular activities. Several decades ago, those activities
might have included playing the violin, or belonging to a chess club. Today, those activities
might include belonging to a lacrosse team, or volunteering at a homeless shelter. Critics
of holistic admissions factors charge that they provide a means for prestigious colleges to
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discriminate against Asian applicants.13 e model suggests a channel through which this
discrimination may take place. An admissions committee, disallowed from directly exclud-
ing candidates based on their last name, might instead favor applicants who engage in a
traditionally non-Asian activity, such as playing the violin. Over time, Asian families learn
about this preference, and soon, whether an applicant plays the violin is non-informative
about his ethnicity, and the college admissions committee must switch to favoring playing
lacrosse. Importantly, a candidate who plays lacrosse signals only that he understands that
the sort of thing one does to get into a a prestigious college is play lacrosse.emodel there-
fore suggests that programs which educate people about the sorts of things one does to get
into a good college may be self-defeating. If a college cannot discriminate on the basis of
extra-curricular activities, it may either move to explicit discrimination, or stop discrimi-
nating.
In ‘e Coolhunt’14, Malcolm Gladwell presents an axiomatic denition of the concept
of ‘cool’, which I re-phrase here:
1. Cool cannot be manufactured, only observed.
2. Cool can only be observed by those who are themselves cool.
3. e act of observing cool causes cool to take ight.
e result of these three rules, writes Gladwell, is a ‘closed loop, the hermeneutic circle of
13‘For Asian Americans, a changing landscape on college admissions’, Los Angeles Times, February 2015.
14‘e Coolhunt’,e New Yorker, March 1997.
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coolhunting’, in which the cool are always chasing the next trend, and the adoption of that
trend is the thing which causes it to be uncool. In this paper, I present a model which I argue
formalizes these axioms.
Generally speaking, an economist’s explanations for the existence of advertising tend
to radically dier from everyone else’s. One channel through which advertising is com-
monly perceived to work is by somehow manipulating the perceptions consumers draw of
the product. Advertisers themselves see this as a crucial component of their cra.15 In this
story, someone who bought an Apple computer in the 1980s was not necessarily buying a
better computer as much as he was buying an identity as a non-conformist artistic type, a
perception that Apple encouraged with their famous ‘1984’ and ‘ink Dierent’ campaigns.
See Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for a formal economic model of identity. is paper sug-
gests an alternate rationale for what it might mean to buy an identity, namely, that buying
certain products might credibly signal to others something about oneself. Consumers of
Apple products, for example, could credibly signal that they were the sort of people who un-
derstood that Apple products are cool. Apple’s ‘inkDierent’ campaign hardlymentioned
the name of the company, instead featuring pictures of artists and inventors. In fact, a com-
mon feature of much modern advertising is that it is deliberately vague about the product
being advertised. is is explained within the context of the model, if we imagine that an
advertising rm is interested in designing an ad campaign for a product which people are
15See, e.g.,Ogilvy on Advertising, by David Ogilvy: ‘ese three brands have dierent images which appeal
to dierent kinds of people. It isn’t the whiskey they choose, it’s the image.e brand image is 90 of what a
distiller has to sell.’
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buying to signal that they are part of a high-status group, then there is a tradeo: Too little
advertising, and the low-status group fails to buy the product, too much advertising, and
the worth of the product to the high-status group is less.is model provides a framework,
grounded in agents with standard preferences, in which to ask questions about the optimal
release of information by an advertising rm which controls the parameters of the model.
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2 | Voting as a signal of education
2.1 Introduction
Why do voters vote in large elections? e natural answer, suggested by political scientists
such as Downs (1957), is that voters vote because they want to inuence the outcome of the
election. But the chance of swaying a large election (the ‘pivot probability’) is so small1 that
it seems implausible that it plays any signicant role.is is the ‘paradox of voting’.
In this paper, I consider the following resolution to the paradox: It may be that some
voters are better informed (perhaps because they are better educated) than others about
the quality of the two candidates; and further, it may be that voters have a preference for
choosing to vote if doing so leads others to believe that they are better informed about the
quality of the candidates, even though better informed and worse informed voters have the
same ex-post cost of voting and value from a candidate’s election. Imagine, for example,
that some voters are well-educated, and others are not.e well-educated voters read about
politics, and have a good idea of the relative worth of the various candidates. Hence, the
expected return to their vote is higher than to that of a uneducated voter, since they are
1About 1 in 60 million in the US, as estimated by Gelman et al. (2009).
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more likely to make the right decision. By itself, this would be insucient to compel them
to vote, since the chance of swaying the election is relatively small. But they show up on
election day and vote, because they have preferences for appearing to be well-informed.e
uninformed voters are aware that, if they vote, they will be perceived as well-informed, but
they remain at home, because the gains from appearing to be well-informed do not quite
outweigh the reduced value they expect their vote will bring.2
is paper contributes to the literature on the paradox of voting in two ways. First, it
provides an alternate, informational channel throughwhich votersmay bemotivated to vote,
one which is consistent with the stylized facts of the voting literature, as well as the intuition
that people vote because they wish to signal that they are well-informed. Second, it resolves
a paradox from the literature on uncertain voters (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996), which
is that such models predict large increases in voter participation as rates of education have
risen in the US. If anything, voter participation has fallen. is paper applies an insight of
the uncertain voter literature (that a better informed voter may receive, on average, a higher
payo from voting) to a model with players who have concerns for signaling that they are
better informed. In the literature on uncertain voters, the gain from voting comes from
one’s absolute level of information, but when players wish to signal that they have better
informed, the gain from voting comes from one’s level of information relative to others, and
hence, voter participation rates in the model in this paper are driven not by the absolute
2at there is some signaling value to voting, regardless of whether it is driven through the described
channel, is dicult to dispute, see for example the well-established fact that self-reported voter participation is
always signicantly higher than actual voter participation, suggesting that many individuals lie in an attempt
to ‘look good’ when the pollster calls.
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quality of information, but in the relative dispersion of heterogeneity in information across
the population.
2.1.1 Prior literature
Amodel of voter turnout was analyzed formally by Ledyard (1984), who found that while it is
possible to sustain high turnout equilibria in a voting game, such equilibria seem intuitively
implausible, depending on ‘knife-edge’ constructions. For example, itmay be an equilibrium
for 1 million people to vote, 500,000 for either candidate, so that each voter’s vote is pivotal.
is intuition was formalized by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) and Myerson (2000), who
observed that high turnout equilibria do not survive the introduction of uncertainty about
game parameters, specically, population. Some attempts have been made to salvage the
idea that high turnout can be sustained if voters care only about swaying the election by
considering correlated equilibria (Pogorelskiy, 2014). But any such explanationmust rely on
large pivot probabilities, which empirically we do not observe (Gelman et al., 2009).
Empirical observations do however motivate other explanations. One robust empirical
nding is that voters tend to be wealthier and better educated on average.3 Posner (1998)
proposes that wealthier voters have a lower cost of voting, and therefore voting serves as a
credible signal (in the sense of Spence (1973)) of their wealth. A related explanation is that
more educated voters are also more ‘civically minded’, meaning they are more likely to ben-
et from cooperation with others, and that they vote to signal their civic mindedness. Funk
3All stylized facts about voting discussed here are taken fromWolnger and Rosenstone (1980) and Leigh-
ley and Nagler (2013).
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(2005, 2010) was the rst to analyze this explanation formally as well as empirically, show-
ing that Swiss cantons in which the cost of voting was lowered through the introduction
of mail-in voting paradoxically saw reductions in voter turnout. Other empirical studies4
reach similar conclusions.
Aytimur et al. (2014) expands on the concept of ‘civic-mindedness’ by formallymodeling
a second stage, aer voting publicly occurs, in which players match with other members of
their community. High type voters place a higher value on such matches, and on swaying
the outcome of the election.en even in games with a large population, high voter turnout
is supported even though the chance of swaying the election is minuscule.
It is unclear in these models what special role voting plays—beyond providing a costly
action that players can use as a signal. In particular, the same results would hold in this
setting if, instead of having the option to vote in an election, players had the option to wait
in line for an hour at the high school gym, walk into a booth, put checkmarks on a piece of
paper, then hand it to a volunteer, whowould immediately throw it away. Whywould we use
voting, which has important real world consequences, as a signaling device when so many
other signaling devices are available? One explanation (Posner, 1998) appeals to Schelling
(1980)’s concept of ‘focal points’ to argue that some actions fall naturally into the role of sig-
naling device. Another explanation (Pesendorfer (1995), who applies the concept to think
about fashion trends) is that signaling devices do not arise by chance, rather, they are strate-
gically created by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Sunstein, 1995). Both stories, of focal points and of
4Kousser andMullin (2007), also see chapter 4 in Leighley and Nagler (2013) for a summary of the empir-
ical research on this question in the political science literature.
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norm entrepreneurs, are compelling explanations for why voting might serve as a signaling
device. For the former explanation, in a democracy voting is a regular, somewhat costly
occurance, and so a natural focal point; for the latter explanation, regular voting is viewed
as an important element of a well-functioning democracy, so that civic leaders may wish to
encourage its role as a signaling device.5
In this paper, I focus on a third channel through which voter may serve as a signaling
device, which is an informational channel. If some voters have better information about
the importance of voting, then their expected returns to voting are higher. e ‘uncertain
voter’ literature suggests that better educated voters may receive more accurate signals of
which candidate is the right one, and so derive a higher utility from voting (Feddersen and
Pesendorfer, 1996; Matsusaka, 1995). At the same time, perhaps voters simply intrinsically
care about voting for the ‘right’ candidate, or alternatively that some voters (‘rule utilitarians’)
care not only about their own well-being, but the well-being of the group to which they
belong (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006). Empirically, this model
is successful in tting the stylized features and demographics of voter turnout (Degan and
Merlo, 2011). However, the model also make a strong prediction, which to my knowledge is
both undiscussed in the literature and falsied by available evidence, namely, that the rise
in average educational attainment across the US over the past century should have resulted
in a corresponding rise in voter turnout—something we have not observed.6
5Or even civically-minded private actors, such as when Facebook made available an ‘I Voted’ sticker to
users.
6For example, in the last US election, approximately 75 of those with bachelor’s degrees or higher voted,
50 of those with a high school voted, and 40 of those with less than a high school education voted. Since
1940, the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree has approximately quintupled, from 5 to 25,
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Certainly it may be true that other factors were at play over the past century. Perhaps
voters became increasingly dissatised with the political process, or perhaps they perceive
candidates as closer ideologically, making voting less worthwhile. However, there is not
much evidence in the US that potential voters have becomemore dissatised with the polit-
ical process, or that potential voters perceive the ideologies of candidates to be converging.7
is paper presents amodel of votingwhich connects the uncertain voter literature to the
signaling literature, and in the process provides an explanation for why voting might serve
as a signaling device. In the model, a group of players must choose between two candidates.
Players do not know their value of swinging the election, but each player observes some
private information. I show that even if we depart from the previous literature on signaling in
voting and assume that the cost and expected value of voting is homogeneous across players,
there is still a role for signaling if players dier in the strength of their private signals, and
if players with more precise signals are valued more highly—in the model, by rms who
pay a wage conditioned on their observed voting behavior and equilibrium strategies. But
other reasonable stories for these gains could include participating in a marriage market or
forming connections with other players as in Aytimur et al. (2014).
In such games, high turnout is supported even as the number of voters grows very large
while the percentage with high school educations has nearly tripled, from 20 to 60. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that if education had a causal impact on voting turnout then it should have contributed
to a 10 percentage point increase in voter turnout. e direct explanation for this discrepancy is that the
correlation between education and turnout has eroded over the past half century, enough to outweigh the
increase in education.
7Leighley and Nagler (2013) examines self-reported measures of the perceived importance of US elec-
tions. e trend is toward perceiving presidential candidates to be more opposed, rather than less, while
alienation shows no discernible trend. Other surveys (http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/
political-polarization-in-the-american-public) nd that political polarization is increasing.
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and the pivot probability disappears. Furthermore, high-turnout equilibria are the only
equilibria for large games. Intuitively, this is because players with more informative sig-
nals are ex-antemore likely to vote.is generates a positive signaling value to voting. Even
as the pivot probability disappears, the eective cost (net of the signaling value) becomes
very low, inducing large numbers of players to vote while still separating by type.
In Section 2.2, I describe the model. In Section 2.3.2, I prove that high-turnout equilibria
are the only equilibria in large games using a measure of informativeness I call max-min
informativeness. In Section 2.3.3, I additionally assume that the quality of player’s informa-
tion can be ordered using a rotation order and use this to prove stronger results, including a
description of how to construct limiting equilibria. In Section 2.3.4, I relax the assumption
that costs are the same across players. I show that if the set of possible costs is discrete then
the results still hold, but that the results are not robust if costs are allowed to be a continuous
random variable. A rough numerical exercise, however, establishes that even when costs are
allowed to be continuous, for reasonable values of N the contribution of signaling to voter
turnout can still be signicant. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Model
A set of n players each have the option of participating in a majority rules election. n is not
known, rather, it is the realization of a random variable drawn from a Poisson distribution
with mean N .at is, this is a Poisson game (Myerson, 1998) of voting.8
8In fact, the results of this paper hold as well if we assume that the population of the game is common
knowledge, because for large games, the binomial distribution is approximated by a Poisson distribution.
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Once n is drawn, an unobserved state of the world θn ∈ Θn is drawn from a distribution
H(θn).e ith component of θn belongs to the nite set Θ ⊆ R, and should be interpreted
as the value to player i of swaying the election, from her least favored candidate to her most
favored candidate. I assumewithout loss of generality that that the elements of Θ are ordered
from least tomost, Θ = {θ1, . . . , θ ∣Θ∣}, that θ1 = 0, and thatH(θn) is symmetric across players
for all n ≥ 0.
Each player has a private type taking values in T = Y × S × C. Y is an interval [γ, γ],
while S = {s1, s2, . . . , s∣S∣}, and C are nite discrete sets. γ ∈ Y represents the precision of a
player’s information, s ∈ S represents a player’s private information, and C ∈ C represents
her preferred candidate. Without loss of generality, assume C = {A, B}.910
Oen in games, the player’s index i is implicitly assumed to be part of her type. In a
Poisson game we assume that a player does not know her index, otherwise, she would have
private information about the size of the game. Accordingly, I drop any conditioning on the
player’s index to emphasize this fact. A player’s type will be denoted (γ, s,C), and her private
valuation θ.
γ and C are drawn identically and independently across players from a distribution
F(γ,C). I assume that γ and C are independent, so that signal precision and candidate
preferences are not correlated, and I assume that the support of F(γ) includes at least 2
elements, {γ, γ}. e signal s is drawn according to Pγ(s ∣ θ). e set of signal distribu-
9Allowing for more than two candidates complicates the expressions for the pivot probability, but not in
an interesting way.
10e Y dimension of the type space is continuous, but not the S dimension. For technical reasons, the
proof of the main result of the paper does not generalize to the case in which S is continuous.
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tions {Pγ(⋅ ∣ θ)}γ denes the information structure of the game as well as a joint distribution
P(γ, s, θ). I assume that Pγ(s ∣ θ) is continuous in γ and that it has full support on S.
Once a player observes her type, she has the option of voting, v = 1, or not voting, v = 0.
If she votes, she incurs some loss k > 0 and votes for her preferred candidate.11e candidate
who receives the majority of the votes wins, and in the event of a tie a coin toss decides the
outcome.
If candidate C wins, then every player with valuation θ whose type species that she
prefers C receives a payo of θ.e players who do not prefer C receive a payo normalized
to zero.12
Aer the election has concluded, there is a second stage to the game. As in Spence (1973)’s
canonical paper on signaling, I think of this stage of the game as one inwhich players are paid
a wage in a competitive job market. (Some alternate, equally valid interpretations include a
stagewhere players form local connections in their community or enter themarriagemarket,
as inAytimur et al. (2014). Further, itmay simply be that players care about howother players
perceive them.) Since the market is competitive, players are paid their expected marginal
worth to the rm, which I assume is the expected value of the component γ of the player’s
type, conditioning only on equilibrium strategies and the player’s voting choice.13 Imagine
11In a Poisson game, voting for one’s own candidate is a strictly dominant strategy, conditional on voting,
so for simplicity we focus strategically only on the decision to vote.
12is normalization is not without loss of generality, since θ is required to be non-negative. at is, we
rule out the case in which players are wrong about which candidate they prefer, and only consider the case in
which players are uncertain about the magnitude of their preference for one candidate over another. Similar
results may be obtained in the more general model, but in a less tractable way.
13Note that since γ is an arbitrary index of the precision of the player’s private information, it may be
preserved under increasing transformations, hence, this assumption is a normalization and without loss of
generality.
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that an employee shows up for work with an ‘I Voted’ sticker, impressing her coworkers; or
that the neighbors think highly of someone who is observed to be going to the polls.
A strategy prole of the game is denoted σ(γ, s,C). It takes values in [0, 1] and denotes
the probability that a voter of type γ, s,C votes. Strategy proles are implicitly taken to be
symmetric across players, this is a consequence of the fact that a player does not learn her
own index, and therefore, asymmetric strategies are impossible.
A player’s ex-post payo under strategy prole σ if her favored candidate wins is
UW(θ , σ , v) = θ + E[γ ∣ σ ,V] − kv . (2.2.1)
If instead her favored candidate loses she receives
UL(θ , σ , v) = E[γ ∣ σ , v] − kv . (2.2.2)
Consistent with prior literature, I call θ the electoral value from voting. It is the direct
reward a player receives from having her favored candidate win. I call E[γ ∣ σ , v] the signal-
ing value from voting. It is the reward a player receives from swaying beliefs about her type
upward.
A voter is pivotal if she makes a tie or breaks a tie. In that event, she either sways the
election toward a 12 chance of her opponent winning the tie, or she sways the election from
a 12 chance of her opponent winning the tie to her opponent winning for sure. In either
case, the expected dierence is 12E[θ ∣ γ, s]. A standard result is that ex ante, a player only
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considers her payo in the event she is pivotal, since this is the only event in which her vote
makes a dierence.e 12 term is a constant and so without loss of generality can be thought
of as included in θ.is observation allows us to write the best reply condition for a player
of type (γ, s,C) to vote as
E[θP(piv ∣ θ) ∣ t]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
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− k®
Cost of voting
≥ 0, (BR)
where P(piv ∣ θ) denotes the probability that a player is pivotal in the game, conditional on
a valuation of θ. I denote themarginal electoral benet of voting byUE(t), and themarginal
signaling benet of voting by US .e voting condition then becomes
UE(t) +US − k ≥ 0, (2.2.3)
making it explicit that the electoral value from signaling depends on the player’s type, while
the signaling value from voting is independent of the player’s type.
I rule out some trivial cases through the following assumptions:
Assumptions
A1 γ − E[γ] > k.
A2 ∃γ ∈ Y s.t. Eγ[θ ∣ s] > k.
Assumption (A1) says that signaling is important enough to players so that if they could
convince the rm that they have the highest value of γ as opposed to the ex ante expectation
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of γ, then that alone would be worth the cost of voting. It rules out equilibria where trivially
only the highest type votes.
Assumption (A2) says that there is at least one player type who, if she knew she could
decide the election, would vote. It rules out equilibria in which trivially no player votes
because costs are too high.
e denition of equilibrium is standard.
Denition A strategy prole σ is an equilibrium i
1. e best response condition, (BR), holds for σ(t) = 1. It holds with equality for σ(t) ∈
(0, 1).e reverse inequality holds when σ(t) = 0.
2. e marginal signaling benet of voting and the marginal electoral benet of voting
are consistent with Bayes rule wherever possible.
For a xed type distribution, I consider games with a large population. Formally, x a
type distribution, and denote the sequence of games obtained only by varying the parameter
N , which is the average number of players in the game, as {ΓN}∞N=1. Denote a corresponding
sequence of equilibria of these games by {σN}∞N=1. We will be interested in analyzing the
property of equilibria of such games in the limit as N grows large.14
14Note that since the type distribution depends on the realized number of players, n, the distribution over
types is allowed, but not required, to change as N grows large. is is important to note only because it is
general, there is no interesting sense in which the results are dependent on allowing qualitatively dierent type
distributions for dierent values of n.
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2.2.1 Assumptions on the information structure
e parameter γ orders the quality of information of players. In this section, I discuss for-
mally the meaning of that statement.
For technical reasons, I assume ∣S∣ ≥ ∣Θ∣, that is, there are at least asmany signals as states,
and I assume that there is at least one type γ ∈ [γ, γ) for which the informationmatrix whose
i jth component is given by P(θ j ∣ si) has rank ∣Θ∣. I assume without loss of generality that
Eγ[θ ∣ s] is increasing in s for all γ.
I assume that γ orders Pγ with an order I call max-min informativeness, which can be
thought of as a weakening of Blackwell’s ordering. (For a comparison of max-min infor-
mativeness to other information orderings, see Lemma 10, in the appendix.) Intuitively,
max-min informativeness captures the following idea. Imagine two Bayesians, Alice and
Bob, forming beliefs over some state based on some private information. Say Alice knows
that Bob will never expect the value of the state variable to be larger than some number, θ∗,
regardless of the signal realization.en if Alice also believes that Bob has better informa-
tion, in the sense of max-min informativeness, she should also never expect the state to be
higher than θ∗, regardless of the signal realization. at is, the maximum possible disper-
sion of conditional expectations, as measured by the maximum possible belief on the state
variable less the minimum possible belief on the state variable, should be increasing in the
informativeness of the signal.
Formally,
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Denition If Pγ , Pγ′ satisfy the following conditions, then Pγ′ is max-min more informa-
tive than Pγ:
max
s
Eγ[g(θ) ∣ s] ≤ (<)maxs Eγ′[g(θ) ∣ s] (2.2.4)
min
s
Eγ[g(θ) ∣ s] ≥ (>)mins Eγ′[g(θ) ∣ s], (2.2.5)
for all g(θ) (for all g(θ) such that Eγ′[g(θ) ∣ s] is non-constant over s).
Max-min informativeness formalizes the intuition that more informed players poten-
tially have more extreme beliefs, that is, are more certain about the value of θ. An objection
to this intuition is that, in actuality, we may think of less informed voters as being the ones
likely to hold more extreme beliefs. A discussion of this idea is beyond the scope of this
paper, beyond the observation that, in general, if there is value to appearing to be well in-
formed, and the well informed are more likely to be certain in their beliefs, then it is not
hard to imagine that less informed players face a strong incentive to exaggerate the strength
of their convictions.
2.2.2 Firm beliefs
In the canonical signaling game, o-equilibrium actions and the beliefs of rms in response
to such actions are important. For example, consider a game where γ ∼ U[0, 1], and c = 0.1.
Consider a strategy prole which species that all players vote. Say rms have pessimistic
beliefs: upon seeing no voting, they assume that the player is of type γ.en in equilibrium
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US = E[γ ∣ v] = 12 . Since US > k, voting is a strictly dominant strategy.
ese sorts of equilibria exist, but are not the focus of this paper. erefore, I restrict
attention to equilibria in which, if all or none of the players are voting,US = 0, which suces
to eliminate them as equilibrium candidates.
2.3 Analysis
is section has ve parts. In Section 2.3.1, I introduce some preliminary results and nota-
tion.
In Section 2.3.2, I prove the basic result that voting percentages remain large (Meaning,
bounded away from zero.) even for games with large populations.
In Section 2.3.3, I prove a stronger result under the assumptions that γ orders Pγ with
a rotation order and that valuations are independently and identically distributed across
players, and I explicitly compute the limiting equilibrium.
In Section 2.3.4, I relax the assumption that costs are the same across players and allow
it to instead be an independently and identically distributed random variable. I show that
previous results hold when costs belong to a nite set, but not when costs are allowed to be
continuous. I perform some numerical calculations, however, to demonstrate that the con-
tribution of signaling concerns to voter turnout may still be signicant even when costs are
continuously distributed (but that still, as population grows large, voter turnout disappears.)
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2.3.1 Useful facts and notation
Given a strategy prole σ , let V denote the expected percentage of players voting in equi-
librium, let Vγ denote the expected percentage of players with type component γ voting in
equilibrium. Formally,
Vγ ∶=∑
s,C
Pγ(s,C)σ(γ, s,C) (2.3.1)
V ∶= ∫
γ
VγdF(γ). (2.3.2)
A useful fact about Poisson games which I will use in future propositions is that as N
grows large, if the expected percentage of players voting is bounded away from zero, then
the probability that a player will be pivotal disappears, independently of the strategy prole:
Lemma 4. Let {σN}∞N=1 be a series of strategy proles on the corresponding sequence of games,
{ΓN}∞n=1. Let {VN}∞N=1 denote the corresponding expected percentage of players voting, as de-
ned by (2.3.2), such that the sequence {VN}∞N=1 is bounded from below by zero.en
lim
N→∞PσN(piv) = 0. (2.3.3)
e proof is in the appendix. Lemma4 rules out the intuitively implausible, high-turnout,
knife-edge equilibria of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), by showing that no strategy prole
(equilibrium, or otherwise) can support high pivot probabilities, and hence, in equilibrium,
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voter turnout must vanish as N grows large.
Finally, I list some of the useful features of Poisson games derived in Myerson (2000)
and Myerson (1998):
1. Every player in a game with average population N believes that the number of other
players in the game is a Poisson random variable with mean N .
2. If the probability that an event occurs for any arbitrary player is p, then the total num-
ber of players for whom that event occurs is a Poisson random variable with mean
pN . For example, the number of players who prefer candidate A is a Poisson random
variable with mean F(A)N .
3. If players of type C vote with probability pC , then the pivot probability for players who
prefer candidate Amay be explicitly written as
∞∑
k=0
e−ρApAN(ρApAN)k
k!
e−ρB pBN(ρBpBN)k
k!
(1 + ρBpBN
k + 1 ) .
Note that the pivot probability is always strictly positive.
2.3.2 Voter turnout in large games
e next proposition states the general result for this model, that in large games the voting
percentages must be bounded away from zero.
e bulk of the proof is concerned with the diculty that player valuations may be cor-
related. Intuitively, imagine a player who sees a signal which leads her to believe her electoral
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value from swaying the election, θ, is very high. Should she therefore also infer from that
signal that she has a high marginal electoral value to voting? On one hand, she believes θ
to be very high. But on the other hand, if the player’s valuations are suciently correlated,
she also believes that other players believe θ to be high, and so perhaps she believes that
voter turnout will be high. en P(piv ∣ θ) is decreasing in θ, and θP(piv ∣ θ) may be
non-monotonic.
Working directly with P(piv), the unconditional probability that a player is pivotal, is
complicated, and θP(piv ∣ θ) promises to be even more so. (For completeness, the full ex-
pression is contained in the appendix.)e proof of Proposition 17 instead exploits the prop-
erty ofmax-min informativeness to argue that, regardless of the specic shape of θP(piv ∣ θ),
if voting turnout were to disappear, then eventually high γ type players would be the only
players voting, and so the signaling return would be very high, inducing all players to vote.
Proposition 17. Let {σN}∞N=1 be a sequence of equilibria of games, each with expected pop-
ulation N. Denote the corresponding voting percentages (2.3.2) and (2.3.1) in these games by
VN ,VNγ , and the marginal electoral and signaling benets by UNS ,UNE .en
1. UNS and UNE converge to U∞S ,U∞E , satisfying
U∞S = k
U∞E = 0.
e pivot probability PσN(piv) converges to 0.
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2. Voting percentages are bounded away from zero,
lim inf
N→∞ VN > 0. (2.3.4)
e proof is contained in Appendix A.1. e intuition of the result is best seen by con-
sidering what would happen if voter turnout, as a percentage of the total population, were
to disappear as N grew large. In essence, the electoral return to voting is dependent on the
absolute number of voters, while the signaling return to voting is dependent on the relative
number of voters of each type voting. If the percentage of voters vanishes, eventually, the
only voters voting are the very highest type voters, a consequence of the max-min assump-
tion. So, the signaling return to voting must become large as the percentage of voters voting
vanishes. In the limit, eventually only the highest type of voter ever votes in equilibrium—
and so, voting is associated with a signaling value of γ. Assumption A1 then implies that
every player in the game strictly prefers to vote regardless of their perception of the electoral
value of their vote, and so it cannot be that in equilibrium the percentage of voters vanishes.
To further illustrate the intuition behind this result, I now prove a stronger result with
stronger assumptions.
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2.3.3 Constructing equilibria
Assume that the player’s valuation of the importance of the election are independent and
identically distributed,
H(θn) = n∏
i=1 H(θ), (2.3.5)
and γ orders Pγ using a rotation order.
e importance of the rotation order and independence assumption is that it simplies
the problem of nding the expected electoral value and the strategy proles, as summarized
by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Say that γ orders F with a rotation order, and say valuations are independently and
identically distributed.en the probability a voter attaches to being pivotal is independent of
the value the voter attaches to swaying the election, i.e.,
Eγ[θP(piv ∣ t) ∣ s] = Eγ[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C). (2.3.6)
Furthermore, strategy proles in equilibrium are characterized by cutos s(γ,C), such that
σ(γ, s,C) ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{0} s < s(γ,C)
[0, 1] s = s(γ,C)
{1} s > s(γ,C)
, (2.3.7)
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0 1
s
Eγ0[θ ∣ s]P(piv)
Eγ1[θ ∣ s]P(piv)
Eγ2[θ ∣ s]P(piv)
s(γ0,C) s(γ1,C)
k −US
s
Figure 2.1: An example of the conditional distributions induced by a rotation order when
γ0 > γ1 > γ2.
Ex-ante, at the given level of k−US , 1−s(γ0 ,C) percent of players of type γ0 ,C are expected to vote, 1−s(γ1 ,C)
percent of players of type γ1 ,C are expected to vote, and 0 percent of players of type γ2 are expected to vote.
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and these cutos have the feature that s(γ,C) is monotone in γ.
e proof is in the appendix. Lemma 5 is a great simplication of the problem, since
otherwise, the electoral value Eγ[θP(piv ∣ t) ∣ s]may be very complicated. It establishes that
when signals are independent, the expected marginal electoral value is proportional to the
expected value of swaying the election and the pivot probability is independent of a player’s
private information.
Proposition 18. Again, let {σN}∞N=1 be a sequence of equilibria of games with expected pop-
ulation N. Denote the corresponding voting patterns in these games by VN ,VNγ ,UNS ,UNE . If
player’s valuations are independently and identically distributed, and γ orders F according to
a rotation order, then
1. σN ,VN ,VNγ ,UNS ,UNE converge to σ∞,V∞,V∞γ ,U∞S ,U∞E . e pivot probability P(piv ∣
σN) converges to 0. (Convergence.)
2. V∞ > 0, U∞S = k, and U∞E = 0. (Voter turnout remains high in large games.)
3. V∞γ is non-decreasing in γ. (High types vote more.)
4. V∞ and V∞γ are decreasing in k, and U∞S is increasing in k. (A higher cost of voting
leads to less voting from all types. More low types than high types stop voting as costs
increase.)
5. ere exist information structures F , F ′ such that EF[γ] > EF′[γ], but voting participa-
tion is lower in equilibrium under F then F ′. (Even though voting is positively correlated
with γ, increasing average γ doesn’t necessarily increase voter turnout.)
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e proof is in the appendix, here I discuss the intuition. Parts 1 and 2 are consequences
of Proposition 17. e monotonicity results, parts 3 and 4, are a straightforward conse-
quences of the assumption of a rotation order. (See Figure 2.1 for a graphical intuition.)
e nal part of the proposition, 5, establishes that it is possible for the average level of in-
formedness to increase, and for voting participation to fall. e intuition for this result is
analogous to that in a Spence signaling model, in which, for example, increasing the prior
probability of the high type may reduce levels of education (the extreme example being the
case in which there is a prior probability of 1 that a player is the high type, and hence no
education may be supported in equilibrium).
Results 1, 2, and 3 of Proposition 18 are unsurprising. 4 states that, as costs increase, all
types are less likely to vote, but low types are proportionally even less likely to vote than
high types. is occurs because, in order to outweight the increase in costs and maintain
voter participation, in equilibrium the signaling returns to voting must increase, and so the
relative proportion of high types voting must also increase.
Of particular interest is 5, which is a formalization of the claim that this model provides
a resolution to the paradox that, counter to what is suggested by models of uncertain voters,
voter participation in theUnited States has fallen over the past century even as education has
greatly increased. Informally, voter participation is driven by the dispersion of the quality of
information, not the absolute quality of information available to players, so that it is possible
to increase the quality of all the player’s information, but, by reducing the spread in quality,
reduce the signaling return to voting, and so, in turn, reduce voter participation.
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2.3.4 Heterogeneous costs
Here, we allow costs to be stochastically drawn across individuals. Importantly, costs are not
allowed to depend on the player’s type, otherwise, signaling is supported through standard
channels as in Spence (1973). e interesting case is when costs are required to be inde-
pendently and identically distributed across agents. So, say that a player’s type now includes
their cost, that is, t = (γ, s,C , k), and k is drawn independently and identically across players
from some set K.
When K consists of a nite number of elements, we have the following result, analogous
to Proposition 17:
Proposition 19. Let {σN}∞N=1 be a sequence of equilibria of games, each with expected popu-
lation N. Say K is a nite set.en
1. UNE converges to U∞E = 0. e limit points of {UNS }∞N=1 is a subset of K, and the pivot
probability PσN(piv) converges to 0.
2. Voting percentages are bounded away from zero,
lim inf
N→∞ VN > 0. (2.3.8)
Proposition 19 diers from Proposition 17 in the behavior ofUNS , the marginal signaling
return to voting. In Proposition 17, the marginal signaling return to voting approached the
cost of voting. is was a necessary consequence of the fact that, in order to support sep-
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aration of types in voting behavior in equilibrium, the signaling return to voting (which is
common knowledge across types) had to approach the cost of voting, since the pivot proba-
bility (and so the marginal electoral return to voting) vanishes as N grows large. In Proposi-
tion 19, the possible equilibrium values for the marginal signaling return to voting must be
close to the elements of K, and for the same reason.e proof is otherwise identical to that
of Proposition 17 and so omitted.
On the other hand, voter turnout disappears when costs are allowed to be drawn from
a continuous distribution. Assume that k is drawn according to some density function with
full support on [0,∞). A more general result holds for more general continuous distribu-
tions, but requires a more careful treatment of the support of costs which is here omitted for
simplicity.
Proposition 20. Let {σN}∞N=1 be a sequence of equilibria of games, each with expected popu-
lation N. Say K is drawn according to some CDF Fk with support on [0,∞). en UNE ,UNS ,
and VN all converge to 0.
Proof. Again, via Lemma 4, as N grows large, the marginal electoral return to voting disap-
pears, UNE
N→ 0, and the maximum possible spread in the distribution of the electoral return
to voting,
(max
t
UNE (t)) − (mint UNE (t)) N→ 0, (2.3.9)
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Dene
κN1 ∶=mint UNE (t)
κN0 ∶=maxt UNE (t).
Re-stating (2.3.9), we have κN1 − κN0 N→ 0. e best response condition, (BR), implies that,
by construction, every type with k < κN1 will vote, independently of the precision γ of their
private information, while every type with k > κN0 will not vote, again independently of
γ. With players whose cost falls in [κN1 , κN0 ], the maximum signaling return to voting is
generated by the strategy in which only the highest types, γ, vote, and so the signaling return
to voting is at most
UNS ≤
Mass of players who vote conditional on γ, sucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright(Fk(κN1 ) − Fk(κN0 )) ×
Maximummarginal signaling returnucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright(γ − E[γ])
N→ 0,
at is, as κN1 → κN0 , the expected γ type of a voter eventually equals the expected γ
type of a non-voter, since, in the limit, players base their voting decision only on the cost of
voting, which is independent of γ, s, and soUNS
N→ 0. But then, the optimality condition (BR)
implies that, as N →∞, eventually the only players voting are those for whom k = 0, which,
since k is continuously distributed, is a measure zero set of voters, and so VN N→ 0.
Proposition 20 states that when costs are continuously distributed, voter turnout disap-
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pears in the limit, which runs counter to the message of Proposition 17. One interpretation
of Proposition 20 is that it demonstrates the extent to which Proposition 17 is a knife-edge
result, relying as it does on a single cost (or, as in Proposition 19, a discrete set of costs) for
all players. But Proposition 17 is a limiting result, intended to illustrate the intuition that
introducing signaling concerns about the quality of one’s information may increase voter
turnout signicantly.e limiting result, that voter turnout does not disappear, may be sen-
sitive to the assumption that costs take at most a nite number of values. But I now show
via numerical example that, for reasonable nite values of N , the signaling return to voting
may be quite substantial, even when costs are allowed to be continuous.
2.3.5 Numerical example with continuous costs and nite N
To that end, assume either candidate is favored with equal probability, that Θ = {0, 1}, each
valuation equally likely and independently distributed across players, and that there are two
sorts of voters: Half learn nothing about the value of voting, and so attach an expected worth
to the value of swaying the election of 0, and the other half learn the value of swaying the
election perfectly, so that half learn that θ = 1, and the other half learn that θ = 0. Let the
rst, uninformed group of voters be represented by γ = 0, and the second, informed group
of voters be represented by γ = 1. Costs, we assume, are uniformly distributed on the interval
(k, 1], with k > 0, so that a type which learns that θ = 0 will never vote. We assume that, if
players are indierent between voting or not, they break the tie in favor of not voting (this
is without loss of generality, since indierence is a zero-probability event).
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First, consider the case in which there is no signaling concern. Since player’s valuations
are independent, the probability any player attaches to being pivotal is independent of his
valuation, andhence, is the same across all players. Anuninformedplayer has an expectation
on θ of 12 , and so votes if and only if
1
2
P(piv) ≥ k,
hence, the probability that an uninformed voter votes, is
Vγ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 12P(piv) ≤ k
( 12P(piv) − k) /(1 − k) 12P(piv) > k.
Similarly, informed players who learn that θ = 1 vote with probability
Vγ,θ=1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 P(piv) ≤ k
(P(piv) − k) /(1 − k) P(piv) > k.
In equilibrium, at least one player type votes with positive probability, since otherwise, every
voter is pivotal with probability 1. Hence, the pivot probability must at least satisfy P(piv) >
k, and the probability that an informed player who learns that θ = 1 is
Vγ,θ=1 = (P(piv) − k) /(1 − k),
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while for informed players who learn that θ = 0 never vote,
Vγ,θ=0 = 0.
e unconditional probability that a player votes, V , can therefore be written as
V = ( 12P(piv) − k) /(1 − k)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Uninformed voters
χP(piv)>k + 12 (P(piv) − k) /(1 − k)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Informed voters with θ = 1
. (2.3.10)
e probability that an informed voter votes is higher than the probability that an unin-
formed voter votes (see Figure 2.2, it is important that F be convex for this to be true.)
Using the Poisson nature of the game, we can compute the pivot probability explicitly as
a function of the unconditional probability that another player votes as
P(piv) = ∞∑
j=0 ( e−VN/2(VN/2)
j
j!
)2 (1 + VN/2
j + 1 ) . (2.3.11)
Equations (2.3.10) and 2.3.11 may be jointly solved numerically. When, e.g., k = 0.1, then
the expected voter turnout when N = 100000 (as in Myerson (2000)) is 35 voters, and the
pivot probability is slightly higher than 0.1 (as it must be, in order to induce roughly 35 of
the informed players who believe θ = 1 to vote).
When there are signaling concerns, the marginal signaling return to voting, US , is given
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k1
1
k
Vγ
Vγ,θ=1
Vγ,θ=0
Vγ
P(piv)12P(piv)
Figure 2.2:When there are no signaling concerns, more informed players than uninformed
players vote.
is is consequence of the convexity of F.
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by
US = γVγγVγ + γVγ − γ(1 − Vγ)γ(1 − Vγ) + γ(1 − Vγ) .
e unconditional probability that a player votes is then (note that informed players who
believe θ = 0 never vote, since if they vote then all players strictly prefer to vote, which
cannot be supported in equilibrium)
V = ( 12P(piv) +US − k) /(1 − k)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Uninformed voters
χ 1
2P(piv)+US>k + 12 (P(piv) +US − k) /(1 − k)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Informed voters with θ = 1
.
Again, when k = 0.1, N = 100000, and, now, γ = 0, γ = 100, we may solve this system
of equations numerically to yield an expected voter turnout of ≈ 29, 000, and a marginal
signaling return of ≈ 0.5. e pivot probability is now approximately 0.0001. Dierent
specications yield dierent results, this exercise is intended only to demonstrate that, even
with continuously distributed costs, very high levels of voter participation (around 1 in 3
voting with signaling concerns, versus 35 in 100,000) may be sustained even when the pivot
probability is very low.
2.4 Conclusion
e model presented here demonstrates that by introducing reputational concerns for ap-
pearing to be well-informed into a model of uncertain voters, high levels of voter turnout
99
may be sustained, even in large games when the chance of swaying the election is very small.
I conclude here by asking what sort of empirical evidence would support or refute the thesis
that voters rationally vote to signal their education to others.
In particular, how this behavior is empirically distinguished from, say, simply a taste
for voting, or a model of voting as signaling in the sense of Spence (1973), is an interesting
question. Taking education to be a proxy for informedness, a novel prediction of the model
is that there should be a high degree of correlation between one’s own education, one’s own
voting behavior, and the education of one’s immediate neighbors. If, for example, one lives in
a neighborhood comprised entirely of well-educated neighbors, then one has no signaling
incentive to vote, and voting participation should be low. Similarly, neighborhoods com-
prised entirely of uneducated neighbors would have low voting participation rates, it should
be the diverse neighborhoods with a mix of well educated and uneducated people with the
highest rates voting participation.is sort of phenomenon would identify this model from
models in which individuals, say, simply have a taste for voting, but to the extent that edu-
cation is correlated with wealth, and wealth correlated with the cost of voting, it makes the
same predictions as a model of voting as Spencian signaling. Instead, the model predicts
that neighborhoods diverse in wealth, but not education, should have low voting participa-
tion rates, while neighborhoods diverse in education, but not wealth, should have high voter
participation rates.
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Appendices
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A.1 Omitted proofs
Proposition 5. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ be any equilibrium in which Aα is determined by (1.3.4) for some
boundary g.en
Vα = 2Vβ ,
and under the matching specication of utility, (1.3.1), Vα = 23 and Vβ = 13 .
Proof. β players are indierent between actions in equilibrium. Hence a β player who always
chooses action a = 1 or always chooses a = 0must still expect ex-ante to receiveVβ. Formally,
Vβ = Eµ[U(1,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))] = Eµ[U(0,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))].
Let p1 denote the probability that α players choose a = 1, that is, p1 ∶= Pµ[Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β)], and
similarly let p0 denote the probability that α players choose a = 0. e expected payo to
a β player who always chooses a = 1 is the probability that α players also choose a = 1,
multiplied by his payo in that event (if α players instead choose a = 0, then he receives a
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payo of zero):
Eµ[U(1,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))] = p1Eµ[U(1, 1,Aβ(ρ˜β)) ∣ Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1] + p0 × 0
(A.1.1)
Eµ[U(0,Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β),Aβ(ρ˜β))] = p1 × 0 + p0Eµ[U(0, 0,Aβ(ρ˜β)) ∣ Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0].
(A.1.2)
e expected payo to an α player is the sum of (A.1.1) and (A.1.2):
Vα = p1Eµ[U(1, 1,Aβ(ρ˜β)) ∣ Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1] + p0Eµ[U(0, 0,Aβ(ρ˜β)) ∣ Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0]
= Vβ + Vβ = 2Vβ .
So, Vα = 2Vβ, which establishes the result.
Lemma 6. Let ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩ be an equilibrium strategy prole. If Atα(ρα , ρβ) > Atβ(ρβ) for
some (ρα , ρβ) ∈ [0, 1]2, then Atα(ρα , ρβ) = 1, and similarly, if Atα(ρα , ρβ) < Atβ(ρβ), then
Atα(ρα , ρβ) = 0.
Proof. By Assumption 1, if Aα(ρα , ρβ) > Aβ(ρβ), then
U(1,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)) > U(1,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aα(ρα , ρβ))
= U(0,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aα(ρα , ρβ))
> U(0,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)).
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Since α players see the state, they strictly prefer to choose a = 1 when
U(1,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)) > U(0,Aα(ρα , ρβ),Aβ(ρβ)),
and so Aα(ρα , ρβ) = 1 is the only strategy consistent with optimal behavior. Similar reason-
ing establishes the result for a = 0.
Lemma 7. Let ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩ be an equilibrium.en with probability 1, either
1. Atα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = Aβ(ρ˜β), or,
2. Atα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) ∈ {0, 1} and Aβ(ρ˜tβ) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Fix some t, and pick ρˆβ ∈ projρβ(Supp(µt)).ere are three cases: EitherAtα(ρα , ρˆβ) =
Atβ(ρˆβ), or Atα(ρα , ρˆβ) > Atβ(ρˆβ), or Atα(ρα , ρβ) < Atβ(ρˆβ). In the latter two cases, we must
have by Lemma 6 that Atα(ρα , ρˆα) = 1 or Atα(ρα , ρˆα) = 0, respectively.e result then follows
from showing that ifAβ(ρˆβ) = 0 (respectively, Aβ(ρˆβ) = 1), that the event thatAtα(ρα , ρˆα) = 1
(respectively, Atα(ρα , ρˆα) = 0) is a zero-probability event conditional on ρˆα.
So, assume that Aβ(ρˆβ) = 0. (e case when Aβ(ρˆβ) = 1 is analogous and omitted.) Let
p0 denote the conditional probability that α players choose 0, and p1 denote the conditional
probability α players choose 1.
For Aβ(ρˆβ) = 0 to be a best reply, we must have
p0U(0, 0, 0) + p1U(0, 1, 0) ≥ p0U(1, 0, 0) + p1U(1, 1, 0).
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By Assumption 1, U(0, 0, 0) = U(1, 0, 0) = 0, and U(0, 1, 0) < U(1, 1, 0). Hence, for
Aβ(ρˆβ) = 0 to be a best reply, it must be that p1 = 0.is establishes the result.
Proposition 6. Let ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩, be an equilibrium.en, for all t,
1. Atα satises
Atα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) ∈ {0,Atβ(ρ˜β), 1} and (1.4.10)
2. Atβ(ρβ) solves
Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 0 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ) × (U(0, 0,Atβ(ρβ)) −U(1, 0,Atβ(ρβ)))
= Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 1 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρβ) × (U(1, 1,Atβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Atβ(ρβ))) (1.4.11)
Furthermore, these conditions are sucient for equilibria, in the following sense: Let ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩
be a strategy prole, and say µt are probability distributions over [0, 1]2 consistent with the
outcome path induced by ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩. If for all t ∈ [0,∞), ρα , ρβ ∈ Supp(µt), it is the case that
Aα(ρα , ρβ) satises (1.4.10) and Aβ(ρβ) satises (1.4.11), then ⟨Atα ,Atβ , µt⟩, is an equilibrium.
Proof. Equation (1.4.10) is a consequence of lemmas 6 and 7, and (1.4.11) is the indierence
condition for β players, analogous to equation (1.3.2).is establishes necessity.
Suciency follows by arguing that ⟨Atα ,Atβ⟩ satisfying (1.4.10) and (1.4.11) are best replies,
and µt is consistent.at µt is consistent is a condition of the proposition.at Atβ is a best
reply follows because (1.4.11) is an indierence condition, and so every strategy is a best
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reply.at Atα is a best reply follows because either Atα = Atβ, in which case by Assumption 1
α players are indierent between actions and so every strategy is a best reply, or Atα > Atβ, in
which case Atα = 1 is a best reply, and analogously for Atα < Atβ we have Atα = 0 a best reply
by Lemma 6.
Proposition 7. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩, µ be a stationary equilibrium. en, for all ρ⃗ ∈ Supp(µ), Aα
satises (1.4.10), Aβ solves
∣λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ∣ × (U(0, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(1, 0,Aβ(ρβ)))
= ∣λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ∣ × (U(1, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ))) (1.4.12)
almost surely, and λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ≥ 0 and λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ≤ 0.
Furthermore, these conditions are sucient for equilibria, in the following sense: Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩
be a stationary strategy prole. If for all ρ⃗ ∈ [0, 1]2, it is the case that Aα(ρα , ρβ) satises (1.4.10)
and Aβ(ρβ) satises (1.4.12), then there exists a probability measure µ on [0, 1]2 such that
⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩, is a stationary equilibrium.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we explicitly compute (with some caveats) the formulas
Pµ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β = 0) ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ)∝ ∣ 1rβ(λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ)∣ (A.1.3)
Pµ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β = 1) ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ)∝ ∣ 1rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ)∣ , (A.1.4)
which, together with Proposition 6 yields the necessary conditions for equilibrium, in par-
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ticular, 1.4.12.e sign of λα + λβAβ(ρβ)− ρβ ≥ 0 and λβAβ(ρβ)− ρβ ≤ 0 will be established
in the process of deriving (A.1.3) and (A.1.4). e sucient conditions for equilibrium are
established by applying a theorem from the literature on dynamical systems to establish the
existence of an invariant measure.
It is useful to have µ be an ergodicmeasure with respect to the dynamical system induced
by the strategy prole, ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩. µ is ergodic i all invariant sets, that is, measurable sets
S ⊆ [0, 1]2 with the property that µ(S) = µ(S)∀t ≥ 0, satisfy µ(S) ∈ {0, 1}. Unfortunately,
µ in general is not ergodic. So, I prove the result for ergodic measures whose support either
consists of a xed point, or a periodic orbit, then argue that the result generalizes.15
Take ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩ to be a stationary equilibrium for which µˆ is an ergodicmeasure, whose
support S consists either of a periodic orbit, or a xed point.
If S is a xed point, so that S = {(ρ∗α , ρ∗β)} and µˆ = δ(ρ∗α ,ρ∗β), the Dirac measure which
places probability 1 on (ρ∗α , ρ∗β), then the state variable is commonly known to be (ρ∗α , ρ∗β),
and sowemust haveAα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) = Aβ(ρ∗β) in equilibrium. Hence equation (1.4.12) is trivially
15Ergodic measures may be constructed from µ in the following way: Pick some (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) ∈ Supp(µ), and
let S denote the induced orbit.
S ∶= {(ρα , ρβ) ∣ ∃t ≥ 0, (ρ tα(ρ0α , ρ0β), ρ tβ(ρ0α , ρ0β)) = (ρα , ρβ)}.
By construction, S is a Lipschitz continuous curve in [0, 1]2. Given some µ absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesque measure on [0, 1]2, a new measure µˆ may be constructed from µ conditional on S by its density
function
f µˆ(ρα , ρβ) ∶= fµ(ρα , ρβ)∫S f (ρα , ρβ) dµ ,
where fµ(ρα , ρβ) is the density function corresponding to of µ.en ([0, 1]2 , Σ, µˆ) is a new probability space,
where
µˆ(X) = ∫
X∩S f µˆ(s) dλS , (A.1.5)
and λS should be interpreted as Lebesgue measure on the curve S, that is, (A.1.5) is a line integral.
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satised, since either Aα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) ∈ {0, 1}, in which case by Assumption 1,
U(0, 0,Aβ(ρ∗β)) −U(1, 0,Aβ(ρ∗β)) = U(1, 1,Aβ(ρ∗β)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρ∗β)) = 0,
or Aα(ρ∗α , ρ∗β) ∈ (0, 1), in which case, since (ρ∗α , ρ∗β) is the sole value of the state variable
realized,
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρˆ0β) = Pµ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρˆ0β) = 0.
Now consider the case in which S is periodic, so that there exists a period length P > 0
such that
ρtα(ρ0α , ρ0β) = ρt+Pα (ρ0α , ρ0β)
ρtβ(ρ0α , ρ0β) = ρt+Pβ (ρ0α , ρ0β),
for all t ≥ 0, and for all (ρ0α , ρ0β) ∈ Supp(µˆ). Since (ρtα , ρtβ) is Lipschitz continuous, S is a
curve embedded in [0, 1]2, dierentiable almost everywhere.
Let τ˜ denote the random variable uniformly distributed on the interval [0, P], and x
some arbitrary value of the state variable in the support of µˆ, (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) ∈ Supp(µˆ). I claim
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that
ρ˜0α = ρτ˜α(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) (A.1.6)
ρ˜0β = ρτ˜β(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β). (A.1.7)
at is, I claim that the inference problem of a player who is unsure of the initial condition
is equivalent to the inference problem of a player who knows the initial condition, (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β),
but has uniform beliefs over the time at which he entered the game. is is a consequence
of the ergodic theorem. In more detail, consider the subset Y(R) ⊆ S, where R is some
Lebesgue-measurable subset of [0, P], dened by
Y(R) ∶= {(ρα , ρβ) ∣ ∃t ∈ R, (ρtα(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β), ρtβ(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β)) = (ρα , ρβ)}.
I claim that µˆ(Y(R)) = λ(R), where λ denotes Lebesgue measure on the real line.
Note that this will establish (A.1.6) and (A.1.7), since (ρtα , ρtβ) are Lipschitz continuous in
t they are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, hence, this will establish
the equivalent of µˆ(Y(R)) and λ(R) on all Lebesgue-measurable subsets of S. To see that
µˆ(Y(R)) = λ(R), we apply the ergodic theorem due to Birkho (1931):
Theorem 1 (Birkho). Let (X , Σ, µ) be a probability space, let f be a µ-measurable function,
and let s ∶ R × X → X be a ow, and say µ is invariant with respect to s. en there exists f ∗,
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such that, with probability 1,
lim
T→∞ 1T ∫ T0 f (st(x˜)) dt = f ∗(x˜), (A.1.8)
such that f ∗ satises
∫ f ∗ dµ = ∫ f dµ, (A.1.9)
and
f ∗(x) = f ∗(st(x))∀t ≥ 0 (A.1.10)
almost everywhere.
en, taking f to be χY(R), the indicator function on Y(R), we have from (A.1.8) and the
periodicity of (ρtα , ρtβ) that
f ∗(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) = limT→∞ 1T ∫ T0 χY(R)(st(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β)) dt
= lim
P→∞
1
P
P∑
p=1
1
P ∫ P0 χY(R)(st(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β)) dt
= 1
P ∫ P0 χY(R)(st(ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β)) dt= 1
P ∫ P0 χR(t) dt= λ(R).
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At the same time, note that f ∗ is constant on S by (A.1.10), and so by (A.1.9), we have
f ∗ = ∫ χY(R) dµ
= µ(Y(R)).
Hence, µ(Y(R)) = λ(R).is establishes (A.1.6) and (A.1.7).
e value of (A.1.6) and (A.1.7) is that they allow us to re-cast the inference problem of β
players from one in (ρα , ρβ) space to one in (t, ρβ) space. In the game, β players are unsure
about the value of the initial condition, but know the time they entered, (A.1.6) and (A.1.7)
imply that in a stationary equilibrium in which beliefs are ergodic, this is equivalent to a
player who knows the initial condition, but is unsure at what time he entered, and further-
more, who has uniform beliefs over the time at which he entered the game. (See gure 3.)
Applying a change of variables formula, a candidate for the marginal distribution of ρ˜β
is
f µˆ(ρβ) = ∑
t′∈[0,P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α ,ρˆ0β)=ρβ
∣ d
dt
(ρtβ)−1(t′)∣ Constantucurlyfτ˜(t′)
∝ ∑
t′∈[0,P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α ,ρˆ0β)=ρβ
∣ d
dt
(ρtβ)−1(t′)∣ . (A.1.11)
is expression may not be well-dened, in particular, the summation may be innite, s˙tβ
may not exist, or ddt(ρtβ)−1(t′)may not exist.e following lemma establishes that where it
is not well-dened and the desired result does not hold, is a zero probability set:
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1
0
ρβ
ρβ
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0 1
Figure 3: Equivalence of the inference problems between a player with uniform beliefs over
calendar time, and a player with stationary beliefs over the state.
e inference problem of a β player facing an invariant distribution is equivalent to the inference problem of
a player who knows the initial condition, but has uniform beliefs over the time at which he entered the game.
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Lemma 8. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ be an equilibrium strategy prole with associated consistent, sta-
tionary, ergodic beliefs µ. With probability 1, Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = Aβ(ρ˜β) (so that the indierence
condition (1.4.12) is trivially satised), or (A.1.11) holds.
Proof. Fix some ρˆβ. Equation (A.1.11) is well-dened only when the summation is nite,
when s˙tβ ≠ 0, and when s˙tβ exists.e last case, however, is a zero probability event, since ρtβ
is Lipschitz continuous in t, and so dierentiable for almost all t, and so dierentiable almost
surely. So in what follows, assume s˙tβ is well-dened where it intersects the horizontal line
through ρˆβ, that is, assume the existence of s˙t
′
β at all t′ ∈ [0, P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) = ρˆβ.
What aboutwhen s˙tβ = 0? FromLemma6, there are three cases: Aα(ρα , ρˆβ) = 0,Aα(ρα , ρˆβ) =
Aβ(ρˆβ), or Aα(ρα , ρˆβ) = 1. Correspondingly, there are three relevant cases for s˙tβ from the
laws of motion (1.4.3), (1.4.4):
s˙t′β ∈ {rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ), rβ(Aβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ), rβ(λβAβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ)},
∀t′ ∈ [0, P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) = ρˆβ .
that is, there are three distinct possible slopes for the ρtβ curve where it intersects with ρˆβ,
corresponding to each of the three cases Aα(ρα , ρˆβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρˆβ), 1}. If all three slopes are
non-zero, then the summation in (A.1.11) is nite16 and (A.1.11) is well-dened. If the slope
is zero when Aα = 0, then it is nonzero when Aα = Aβ or Aα = 1, in general, if s˙t′β = 0
16is follows because ρ tβ is Lipschitz continuous and so uniformly continuous on [0, P], hence, at every
point of intersection, t′ ∈ [0, P] s.t. ρ t′β (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) = ρˆβ , there is an interval of width ε > 0, independent of t′,
containing t′, such that ρ tβ = ρˆβ at only one point in that interval, and so there are at most P/ε intersections of
ρ tβ with the line.
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anywhere then it is zero either when Aα = 0, Aα = Aβ, or Aα = 1, in which case the change of
variables formula yields that the probability of the corresponding event at t′ is 1. Consider
each separately:
1. If rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ) = 0, then Aα(ρ˜tα , ρˆβ) = 1 with probability 1, conditional on
ρˆβ, and so Aβ(ρˆβ) = 1 in equilibrium, but then the slope must be rβ(1 − ρˆβ) = 0, so
ρˆβ = 1, and so by Lemma 6 we must have Aβ(ρˆβ) = Aα(ρ˜tα , ρˆβ) = 1 and β players are
indierent between actions.
2. Similarly, if rβ(λβAβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ) = 0, then ρˆβ = 0, and so by Lemma 6 we must have
Aβ(ρˆβ) = Aα(ρ˜tα , ρˆβ) = 0 and β players are indierent between actions.
3. Finally, if rβ(Aβ(ρˆβ)− ρˆβ) = 0, then Aβ(ρˆβ) = Aα(ρ˜tα , ρˆβ) with probability 1, in which
case β players are again indierent between actions.
is proves that, with probability 1, either (A.1.11) is well-dened, or (1.4.12) is trivially sat-
ised because both sides are zero.
Hence for the remainder of the proof, we take (A.1.11) to be well-dened and to hold at
ρˆβ, otherwise, by Lemma 8, the desired result holds almost surely.
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When atα = 1, the marginal distribution of ρ˜β is, by the inverse function theorem,
f µˆ(ρβ , atα = 1)∝ ∑
t′∈[0,P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α ,ρˆ0β)=ρβ ,at′α =1
∣ d
dt
(ρtβ)−1(t′)∣
= ∑
t′∈[0,P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α ,ρˆ0β)=ρβ ,at′α =1
1∣s˙t′β ∣
= ∑
t′∈[0,P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α ,ρˆ0β)=ρβ ,at′α =1
1∣rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ)∣´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Independent of t′
= ∣ M1(ρβ)
rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ)∣ ,
where M1(ρβ) is the count of how many times α players play 1 at ρβ, i.e., M1(ρβ) ∶= ∣{t′ ∈
[0, P] s.t. ρt′β (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β) = ρβ , at′α = 1}∣. Analogously,
f µˆ(ρβ ,Atα = 0)∝ ∣ M0(ρβ)rβ(λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ)∣ ,
where M0(ρβ) is the number of times α players play 0 at ρβ. Hence we have conditional
probabilities at ρˆβ of
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 1 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρˆβ)∝ ∣ M1(ρˆβ)rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ)∣ (A.1.12)
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 0 ∣ ρ˜tβ = ρˆβ)∝ ∣ M0(ρˆβ)rβ(λβAβ(ρˆβ) − ρˆβ)∣ . (A.1.13)
e desired result then follows by showing thatM0(ρˆβ) = M1(ρˆβ).is follows by a graph-
ical argument. Note that rβ(λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ) > 0 > rβ(λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ). (We previously
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considered the case inwhich either of these expressions, the slope of the ρtβ curve, were zero.)
at is, the ρtβ curve is crossing the line {(t, ρˆβ), t ∈ [0, P]} from below when Aα(ρtα , ρˆβ) = 1
(since it has a positive slope when Aα(ρtα , ρtβ) = 1), and from above when Aα(ρtα , ρˆβ) = 0
(since it has a negative slope when Aα(ρtα , ρtβ) = 1). But for ρtβ to be periodic, we must have
ρ0β = ρPβ , and so the ρtβ curve must cross the line {(t, ρˆβ), t ∈ [0, P]} from above exactly
as many times as it crosses it from below (see gure 3), so M0(ρˆβ) = M1(ρˆβ), which es-
tablishes A.1.3 and A.1.4 for the ergodic measure µˆ. Hence, we have established (1.4.12) for
ergodic measures, µˆ.
Do A.1.3 and A.1.4 hold for all invariant measures? By Lemma 9 in Appendix A.1, the
stationary equilibrium ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ may be written as a convex combination of stationary
equilibria ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩, where µˆ is ergodic, for each of which we established the indierence
condition (1.4.12). erefore, the indierence condition (1.4.12) must also hold for all sta-
tionary equilibria.
It remains only to argue that given some ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ satisfying (1.4.12) and (1.4.10), that
there exists consistent beliefs µ such that ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ is stationary. is follows from a di-
rect application of the Krylov-Bogolyubov for dynamical ows,17 and completes the proof
of Proposition 7.
Lemma9. Let ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ be a stationary equilibrium and let M be the set of measures ergodic
with respect to the dynamical system induced by Aα ,Aβ. en µ is a convex combination of
17See Glendinning (1994) for a statement of the theorem.
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the elements of M, that is, there are weights w such that
µ = ∫
M
µˆ dw(µˆ), (A.1.14)
and furthermore, ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩ are best replies under µˆ, up to zero probability events.
Proof. e proof consists of two parts: First, we establish (A.1.14).is is a consequence of
the fact that the ergodicmeasures are the extremal points of the set of all invariant measures.
en, we argue that ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩ is a stationary equilibrium for all µˆ in the support of w.
So x some strategy prole, ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩, and letM be the set of measures invariant with
respect to the dynamical system induced by ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩. It is a consequence of the Krein-
Milman theorem that every element inM is a convex combination of elements of M when
M contains the set of extremal points ofM, andM is convex and compact. I claim that
these conditions are satised:
at M contains the set of extremal points ofM follows because every extremal point
ofM is ergodic. To see this, let µˆ be an extremal point of the set of invariant measures, and
assume it is not ergodic, so that there exists S ⊆ [0, 1]2 such that (ρtα(S), ρtβ(S)) = S (in this
case S is said to be an invariant set) but µˆ(S) ∈ (0, 1). Consider the measures
µ1 ∶= χS µˆµˆ(S) and
µ2 ∶= χSc µˆµˆ(Sc) ,
both well-dened since Sc, the complement of S, is also an invariant set if S is an invariant
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set and so µˆ(Sc) ∈ (0, 1). By construction, µ1 and µ2 are also invariant measures, but µˆ =
µˆ(S)µ1 + µˆ(Sc)µ2, so that µˆ is not an extremal point of the set of invariant measures, and
hence,M contains the set of extremal points ofM.
Furthermore,M is compact in the weak⋆ topology:is follows since [0, 1]2 is compact
so, for any continuous function f ∶ [0, 1]2 → R, any sequence of invariant measures {µn}
converging to some µ, and any t ≥ 0,
∫ f dµ = ∫ limn→∞ f dµn
= ∫ limn→∞ f (ρtα , ρtβ) dµn
= ∫ f (ρtα , ρtβ) dµ
at ∫ f (ρtα , ρtβ) dµ = ∫ f dµ for all t ≥ 0 and all continuous functions f is equivalent to
µ being invariant (see e.g. Glendinning (1994)), hence,M is closed and bounded and so
compact.
M is also convex, since the mixture of two invariant measures is trivially invariant.
erefore, every invariant measure µ ∈ M may be written as a convex combination of
the elements ofM, which establishes the existence of w for which equation (A.1.14) holds.
It remains only to argue that ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩ is a stationary equilibrium, for all µˆ in the sup-
port ofw. Since ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩ is a stationary equilibrium, we have from Proposition 6 that the
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indierence condition (1.4.11) holds. Applying (A.1.14), write the indierence condition as
∫
M
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U0 − Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U 1 dw(µˆ)
= 0, (A.1.15)
where
∆U0 ∶= U(0, 0,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(1, 0,Aβ(ρβ))
∆U 1 ∶= U(1, 1,Aβ(ρβ)) −U(0, 1,Aβ(ρβ))
are independent of µˆ. Fix µˆ ∈ Supp(w), so that µˆ is ergodic. From Proposition 6, ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩
is a stationary equilibrium if Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρβ), 1}∀(ρα , ρβ) ∈ Supp(µˆ), and if the
indierence condition
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U0 = Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U 1 (A.1.16)
is satised. We now proceed to verify that α and β players are best responding in ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩:
Since wˆ is in the support of w, by construction Supp(µˆ) ⊆ Supp(µ), therefore,
Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρβ), 1}∀(ρα , ρβ) ∈ Supp(µ)
Ô⇒ Aα(ρα , ρβ) ∈ {0,Aβ(ρβ), 1}∀(ρα , ρβ) ∈ Supp(µˆ),
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so that α players are best responding in ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩.
Now, we consider β players. Fix ρβ ∈ projρβ(Supp(µ)). Consider the case inwhich (A.1.11)
is well-dened at ρβ, so that
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ)∝ ∣ 1λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ (A.1.17)
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ)∝ ∣ 1λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ , (A.1.18)
almost surely, that is, for all µˆ ∈ Supp(w),
(Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U0 − Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U 1) = 0
or
(Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U0 − Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U 1)
∝ (∣ 1
λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ × ∆U0 − ∣ 1λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ × ∆U 1)
and so, from the indierence condition for ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µ⟩, (A.1.15), we have
0 =
∫
M
Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 0 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U0 − Pµˆ(Aα(ρ˜α , ρ˜β) = 1 ∣ ρ˜β = ρβ) × ∆U 1 dw(µˆ)
∝ (∣ 1
λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ × ∆U0 − ∣ 1λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ × ∆U 1) ,
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so that
∣ 1
λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ × ∆U0 − ∣ 1λα + λβAβ(ρβ) − ρβ ∣ × ∆U 1 = 0,
which is the indierence condition for β players under ⟨Aα ,Aβ , µˆ⟩. Hence, β players are
best responding under µˆ as well, which establishes that β players are best-responding at ρβ
when (A.1.11) is well-dened.
It remains to show that β players are best-responding when (A.1.11) is not well-dened
at ρβ. (It also may occur if s˙tβ is not well-dened, but recall from the proof of Proposition 7
that this is a zero-probability event.)is occurs when s˙tβ = 0, and hence ρtβ = ρ∗β ∀t. By the
laws of motion, this implies that
s˙tα = rα(λαatα + λβatβ´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
ρ∗β
−ρtα)∝ ρ∗β − ρtα . (A.1.19)
So, since µˆ is ergodic (and therefore invariant) we must have ρtα = ρ∗β ∀t, since the dynam-
ical system represented by s˙tβ = 0 and (A.1.19) satisfying ρtβ = ρ∗β ∀t has only one possi-
ble invariant measure whose support is the unique xed point (ρ∗β , ρ∗β). We know that,
by the laws of motion, the only strategy proles which support such a xed point satisfy
Aα(ρ∗β , ρ∗β) = Aβ(ρ∗β) = ρ∗β , and hence β players are best responding in this case as well.
Proposition 11. In every stationary equilibrium under the matching specication of utility, the
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period satises
P ≤ ( 2
rβλα
)(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log(1 + MβMα ) . (1.5.8)
Furthermore, for any P satisfying (1.5.8), there is a stationary equilibrium which induces an
outcome path with that period length.
Proof. e procedure for explicitly computing equilibria described in Section 1.5 results in a
set of 2 equations with unknowns ρ0β, the initial starting value for ρβ(0), and P, the period.
Solving these explicitly yields the period length in terms of the initial choice of ρ0β as
P = 2
rβλα
(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log⎛⎝λβMα +Mβ − ρ0βMβλβMα + ρ0βMβ ⎞⎠ (A.1.20)
Note that this is strictly decreasing in ρ0β. An upper bound for P may therefore be found by
maximizing (A.1.20) over ρ0β ∈ [0, 12), which is ρ0β = 0, for an upper bound of
P ≤ 2
rβλα
(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log(λβMα +MβλβMα ) .
A better upper bound may be found by observing that initial starting values for ρ0β which,
aer following the procedure in Section 1.5 for computing symmetric equilibria, result in
Aβ(ρ0β) < 0, are not supportable by equilibria with periodic outcome paths. Hence, every
value of ρ0β resulting in Aβ(ρ0β) ≥ 0 and ρ0β < 12 , is a feasible starting value. Algebra shows
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that these are the values satisfying
ρ0β ∈ [ λαWα2Wα +Wβ , 12) .
Using this lower bound for ρ0β, and simplifying, yields the upper bound on P.
e second part of the proposition, that there are equilibria supporting all periods be-
tween 0 and the upper bound, follows from the observation that as ρ0β → 0, the period length
also vanishes,
P = 2
rβλα
(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log⎛⎝λβMα +Mβ − ρ0βMβλβMα + ρ0βMβ ⎞⎠
→ 2
rβλα
(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log(λβMα +Mβ − 12MβλβMα + 12Mβ )
= 2
rβλα
(1 + Mα
Mβ
(1 + λβ − λα)) log(λβMα + 12MβλβMα + 12Mβ )
= 0.
Hence, by continuity, there are equilibria supporting all period lengths satisfying (1.5.8).
Corollary 1. e maximum possible period length in symmetric stationary equilibria, denoted
P∗, satises
1. ∂P
∗
∂rβ
< 0, ∂P∗
∂rα
= 0,
2. ∂P
∗
∂λα
< 0, ∂P∗
∂λβ
> 0,
Furthermore, there is a cuto rβ such that
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1. ∂P
∗
∂(Mα/Mβ) < 0 when λβ < rβ and
2. ∂P
∗
∂(Mα/Mβ) > 0 when λβ > rβ.
Proof. (1) and (2) are immediate from the expression for P∗. (3) follows from directly com-
puting (for notational simplicity, letM ∶= Mα/Mβ and ∆r = λα − λβ:
∂2
∂M
P∗ = −4(Mλβ + λα)
rβ(λα − λβ + 2M2λα +M(2λα − λβ)) + 2rβ log( 2(1 +M)
2λα
∆r + 2M2λα +M(2λα − λβ)) .
As λα → 0, this term approaches −∞, which establishes the existence of a cuto.
Corollary 2. Formodel parameters for which P is in the interior of the region dened in (1.5.8),
and for a xed starting value ρ0β, in symmetric stationary equilibria
1. ∂
∂rβ
P < 0,
2. ∂
∂λα
P < 0,
3. ∂
∂λβ
P > 0, and
4. ∂
2
∂Mα/Mβ∂λα P > 0.
Furthermore, there exists a cuto rα ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂∂Mα/Mβ P < 0 if and only if λα < rα.
Proof. e period length, for xed starting value ρ0β, may be written
P = 2(1 +Mα/Mβ)
rβ
log
⎛⎝ −ρ0β + λα(2 +Mα/Mβ)−1 + ρ0β + λα(2 +Mα/Mβ)⎞⎠ .
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From this, (1) and (2) are straightforward, and (3) follows from direct computation as in
Corollary 1.
Proposition 16. In every equilibrium strategy of the form (1.5.11), γ > 1. Furthermore, γ satis-
fying (1.5.12) is decreasing in rα, and increasing in rβ.
Proof. e linear strategy splits the state space into two regions separated by the line ρα− 12 =
γ(ρβ − 12). By construction, γ must be such that the line passes through the points at which
α switches, so the slope of the line is
γ = (1 − ρ0α) − ρ0α(1 − ρ0β) − ρ0β = 1 − 2ρ0α1 − 2ρ0β .
e comparative statics results then follow by computation, using the values derived explic-
itly in the body of the paper.
Lemma 4. Let {σN}∞N=1 be a series of strategy proles on the corresponding sequence of games,
{ΓN}∞n=1. Let {VN}∞N=1 denote the corresponding expected percentage of players voting, as de-
ned by (2.3.2), such that the sequence {VN}∞N=1 is bounded from below by zero.en
lim
N→∞PσN(piv) = 0. (2.3.3)
Proof. Consider rst the probability that the vote is tied, and denote this event T for ‘tie’.
Since G(N) is Poisson, the number of people who vote for candidate C is a Poisson random
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variable with mean NVC , and so this can be written explicitly as
P(T ∣ σN) = ∞∑
k=0
e−NVA(NVA)k
k!
e−NVB(NVB)k
k!
. (A.1.21)
en re-arranging terms yields
∞∑
k=0
e−NVA(NVA)k
k!
e−NVB(NVB)k
k!
= ∞∑
k=0
e−N(VA+VB)(N2VAVB)k
k!2
= e−N(VA+VB) ∞∑
k=0
(N2VAVB)k
k!2
.
e innite series is a Bessel function of order one at N
√
VAVB, denoted I0(N√VAVB). For
large values of x, the following is an approximation to I0:
I0(x) ≈ ex√2pix .
erefore, for N large and at least one of VA,VB positive, the probability of a tie is approxi-
mated by
P(T ∣ σN) ≈ 1
2
√
piN
√
VAVB
e−N(VA+VB−2√VAVB). (A.1.22)
As N grows large V is bounded from below, so at least one of VA or VB must be bounded
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from below, so that VA + VB − 2√VAVB ≥ B0 > 0 is bounded from below for all N . So
lim
N→∞P(T ∣ σN) ≤ limN→∞ 1√N√VAVB e−NB0 = 0,
which establishes the result for the event T .
We also must consider the case in which the player’s preferred candidate is one vote
behind. Similar reasoning establishes that the probability of this event also vanishes. e
pivot probability is the sum of the probabilities for the event there is a tie and the event a
player’s preferred candidate is one vote behind, so the pivot probability vanishes as N grows
large.
Lemma 10. Let Pγ0 and Pγ1 be two information structures. en, if Pγ1 is strictly more infor-
mative than Pγ1 in the Blackwell sense, it is more informative in the max-min sense.
Proof. First, say that Pγ1 is strictly more informative than Pγ0 in the Blackwell sense. Black-
well’s theorem implies that the signal s under γ0 is a garbling of the signal s under γ1, which
we can write as
Pγ0(s ∣ θ) =∑
s′ h(s ∣ s′)Pγ1(s′ ∣ θ). (A.1.23)
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Here h(s ∣ s′) is some kernel mass function.en we have for all signals s,
∑
Θ
g(θ)Pγ0(θ ∣ s) =∑
Θ
g(θ)Pγ0(s ∣ θ)Pγ0(θ)
Pγ0(s)
=∑
Θ
g(θ)Pγ0(θ)
Pγ0(s) ∑s′ h(s ∣ s′)Pγ1(s′ ∣ θ)
=∑
s′ h(s ∣ s′)Pγ1(s′)Pγ0(s) ∑Θ g(θ)Pγ1(θ ∣ s′)
=∑
s′ h(s′ ∣ s)∑Θ g(θ)Pγ1(θ ∣ s′)
≤∑
Θ
g(θ)Pγ1(θ ∣ sγ1), (A.1.24)
where here sγ1 denotes the signal which maximizes the expectation of g(θ) for type γ1.
(A.1.24) shows that the maximum expectation is at least weakly increasing in γ. Similar
reasoning shows that the minimum expectation is weakly decreasing.
Now say that Eγ1[g(θ) ∣ s] is non-constant. en since h(s′ ∣ s) has full support on s′,
the weak inequality in (A.1.24) becomes a strict inequality.
Proposition 17. Let {σN}∞N=1 be a sequence of equilibria of games, each with expected pop-
ulation N. Denote the corresponding voting percentages (2.3.2) and (2.3.1) in these games by
VN ,VNγ , and the marginal electoral and signaling benets by UNS ,UNE .en
1. UNS and UNE converge to U∞S ,U∞E , satisfying
U∞S = k
U∞E = 0.
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e pivot probability PσN(piv) converges to 0.
2. Voting percentages are bounded away from zero,
lim inf
N→∞ VN > 0. (2.3.4)
Proof. First, we show (2.3.4) by contradiction. Fix a sequence of equilibria as described in
the proposition. Assume to the contrary there is an innite increasing subsequence of N,
denoted {Ni}∞i=1, with the property that VN i converges to zero. For simplicity, take Ni = i,
that is, assume that we have a sequence of equilibria with the property thatVN
→
N0. (Analysis
of the more general case proceeds similarly.)
Pick a candidate, C, and let
gN(θ) ∶= θPσN(piv ∣ θ ,C)
RN ∶= {γ ∣ ∃s s.t. (BR) holds for (γ, s,C)}
γ
N
∶= inf RN .
gN(θ) is the marginal electoral value of voting conditioning on the value of swaying the
election to a given voter. RN is the γ type components of players for whom some signal
exists for which they at least weakly prefer to vote. γ
N
is the lowest such type component.
(By continuity, γ
N
∈ RN .)
e following facts are useful and follow directly from the assumption of max-min in-
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formativeness.ey state that a player with some level of information precision, γ, at prefers
to vote aer seeing some signal, then a player with better information also must at prefer to
vote at some signal.
Lemma 11. RN is an interval, [γ
N
, γ].
Proof. Say a player of type (γ, s,C) weakly prefers to vote.en ∀γ′ > γ,
0 ≤ Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] +UNS − k
≤ Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] +UNS − k
≤ Eγ′[gN(θ) ∣ s] +UNS − k,
by max-min informativeness. If (γ, sγ) strictly prefers to vote, then the rst inequality is
strict and the second result follows.
Now consider the limit points of {γ
N
}∞
N=1. To derive a contradiction, we will consider
four possible sets inwhich the limit pointsmay lay, and show that our assumption that voting
percentages disappear implies that the limit points lay in none of these sets, which therefore
implies that the set of limit points of {γ
N
}∞
N=1 is empty. However, {γN}∞N=1 lays in a compact
space, [γ, γ] ∪∞, and so it does have limit points, which provides the contradiction to our
assumption.ese four sets are {γ}, (γ, γ), {γ}, and {∞}.
1. First, consider the set (γ, γ). We show that {γ
N
}∞
N=1 has no limit points in this set
by contradiction. Say there were an innite subsequence indexed by {Ni} such that
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lim
i→∞ γN i = γ∞ ∈ (γ, γ). For simplicity and without loss of generality, take Ni = i.
Fix some N and consider a player with type component γ
N
. By construction, there is
a signal, sγ
N
, at which this player is indierent between voting and not. By Lemma 11,
all players with type components (γ, sγ ,C), where γ ≥ γN must at least weakly prefer
to vote.
Can it be in addition that there are players who strictly prefer to vote with γ type com-
ponents bounded away from γ for large N? If so, Lemma ?? implies that there is a
positive measure of γ types who strictly prefer to vote bounded away from 0 for large
N . Call this bound B0. en for large N , the ex-ante probability of voting occurring
satises
VN ≥∑
s∈S P(s)B0 ds ≥mins P(s)B0 > 0,
which contradicts the assumption that VN → 0.
So for large N , the measure of type components γ for which some player with that
type component strictly prefers to vote must approach zero. More precisely, for every
interval [γ
N
, γ − ε], ε > 0, there exists an N so that every player with type component
γ ∈ [γ
N
, γ − ε] weakly prefers not to vote. (It is an interval by Lemma 11.)
Pick ε small enough so that this is a positive measure set. All such players weakly
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prefer not to vote:
Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ sγ] ≤ k −UNS ∀γ ∈ [γN , γ − ε], s.
In addition, by the construction of γ
N
, aer seeing sγ the player of type (γ, sγ) is in-
dierent:
Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ sγ] = k −UNS ∀γ ∈ [γN , γ − ε],
or, by the denition of sγ,
max
s
Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] = k −UNS ∀γ ∈ [γN , γ − ε].
at is, the upper bound on player’s conditional expectation of g(θ) is constant across
γ ∈ [γ
N
, γ − ε]. e denition of max-min informativeness then implies that for all
signals,
Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] = k −UNS ∀γ ∈ [γN , γ − ε], s ∈ S
and so
min
s
Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] = k −UNS ∀γ ∈ [γN , γ − ε]. (A.1.25)
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Recall from the denition of max-min informativeness that mins Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] is
weakly decreasing in γ. So equation (A.1.25) implies that Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s] is constant
across s for all types with γ ∈ [γ, γ − ε].
Intuitively, the maximum possible dispersion of beliefs for players with type com-
ponent less than γ
N
is ‘pinched shut’ by the dispersion of players with a higher type
component. More precisely, for γ < γ
N
and any sˆ, we have
Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ sˆ] ≥mins Eγ[gN(θ) ∣ s]
≥min
s
Eγ
N
[gN(θ) ∣ s]
=max
s
Eγ
N
[gN(θ) ∣ s]
= k −UNS ,
so that all types below γ
N
at weakly prefer to vote. γ
N
was constructed so that there
could not be any such types, therefore, γ
N
= γ. is proves by contradiction that we
cannot have any limit points in (γ, γ).
2. Now consider whether there might be a limit point in {γ}. Assume there is an innite
subsequence {Ni}∞i=1 of {γN}∞N=1 so that limi→∞ γN i = γ. For simplicity and without
loss of generality, assume that Ni = i. Previous reasoning established that for large N ,
all types with γ ∈ [γ, γ − ε] and any signal were indierent between voting and not, so
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that
Eγ[g(θ) ∣ s] = k −UNS ∀γ, s.
Does such a function g(θ) exist? If it did, then it would solve the system of linear
equations
∑
θ∈ΘPγ(θ ∣ s)g(θ) = k −UNS ,∀s, (A.1.26)
g(0) = 0. (A.1.27)
is is a system of ∣S∣+ 1 equations in ∣Θ∣ unknowns. Recall that ∣S∣ ≥ ∣Θ∣, and there is
at least one type component γ ∈ (γ, γ)whose information structure has rank ∣Θ∣.is
implies that no such solution exists. (See lemma 13 in the appendix for a proof.)
erefore (A.1.26) has no solution and so by contradiction, γ
N
cannot have a limit
point at γ.
3. Now consider whether there might be a limit point in {γ}. Assume there is an innite
subsequence {Ni}∞i=1 of {γN}∞N=1 so that limi→∞ γN i = γ. For simplicity and without
loss of generality, assume that Ni = i. Eventually, only high types vote, and they vote
with vanishing probability.is implies that the signaling return to voting approaches
lim
N→∞UNS = γ − E[γ] > k,
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by assumption. But then eventually UNS > k, and so every type strictly prefers to vote,
a contradiction.
4. is leaves as our only remaining case the one in which limN→∞ γN = ∞. Since we
cannot have nite γ
N
which satisfy γ
N
> γ, this implies that γ
N
is innite in nite
time, which by denition means that eventually all players strictly prefer not to vote.
But then P(piv) = 1 independently of type and US = 0. By assumption, there is a type
γ, s for whom Eγ[θ ∣ s] > k, and so who strictly prefers to vote, so again we have a
contradiction.
erefore γ
N
has no limit points. But as previously argued, this is not possible. So by
contradiction we’ve established that VN is bounded away from 0 and so established
equation (2.3.4).
Lemma 4 then implies that the pivot probabilities converge to zero, and so the expected
marginal electoral return to voting converges to zero.
To see that the expected marginal signaling return to voting converges to k, note that
UNS ≤ k—otherwise, all players would strictly prefer to vote, and we would have UNS = 0.
Can it be that UNS ≤ k − ε < k? If so, as UNE → 0, eventually the incentive constraints of all
types would satisfy
UNE (t) +UNS − k ≤ UNE (t) − ε < 0,
so all types would strictly prefer not to vote, and as we have already seen that cannot be an
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equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Say that γ orders F with a rotation order, and say valuations are independently and
identically distributed.en the probability a voter attaches to being pivotal is independent of
the value the voter attaches to swaying the election, i.e.,
Eγ[θP(piv ∣ t) ∣ s] = Eγ[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C). (2.3.6)
Furthermore, strategy proles in equilibrium are characterized by cutos s(γ,C), such that
σ(γ, s,C) ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{0} s < s(γ,C)
[0, 1] s = s(γ,C)
{1} s > s(γ,C)
, (2.3.7)
and these cutos have the feature that s(γ,C) is monotone in γ.
Proof. Equation (2.3.6) follows from the independence assumptions:
Eγ[θP(piv ∣ t) ∣ s] = Eγ[θP(piv ∣ C) ∣ t]
= Eγ[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C),
since by assumption the valuations of other players are independent of s, γ, and the event
piv only depends on the valuations of the other players.
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en the le hand side of (BR) could be written
1
2
Eγ[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C) +US − c,
which since Eγ[θ ∣ s] is strictly increasing in s establishes the existence of cutos that char-
acterize the equilibrium strategy prole. Recall that there exists a signal s such that Eγ[θ ∣ s]
is constant across γ. en if k − US > Eγ[θ ∣ s], and type (γ, s,C) votes, then s > s and so
type (γ′, s,C), where γ′ > γ, also prefers to vote because
k −US ≤ Eγ[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C) < Eγ′[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C).
In this case, Vγ is increasing.
Similarly, if k −US < Eγ[θ ∣ s], type γ, s prefers not to vote, and γ′ < γ,
k −US ≥ Eγ[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C) > Eγ′[θ ∣ s]P(piv ∣ C).
In this case, Vγ is decreasing.
Finally, if k − US = Eγ[θ ∣ s], then all types who see s > s strictly prefer to vote, and all
types who see s < s strictly prefer not to vote, independently of γ, so Vγ is constant.
Proposition 18. Again, let {σN}∞N=1 be a sequence of equilibria of games with expected pop-
ulation N. Denote the corresponding voting patterns in these games by VN ,VNγ ,UNS ,UNE . If
player’s valuations are independently and identically distributed, and γ orders F according to
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a rotation order, then
1. σN ,VN ,VNγ ,UNS ,UNE converge to σ∞,V∞,V∞γ ,U∞S ,U∞E . e pivot probability P(piv ∣
σN) converges to 0. (Convergence.)
2. V∞ > 0, U∞S = k, and U∞E = 0. (Voter turnout remains high in large games.)
3. V∞γ is non-decreasing in γ. (High types vote more.)
4. V∞ and V∞γ are decreasing in k, and U∞S is increasing in k. (A higher cost of voting
leads to less voting from all types. More low types than high types stop voting as costs
increase.)
5. ere exist information structures F , F ′ such that EF[γ] > EF′[γ], but voting participa-
tion is lower in equilibrium under F then F ′. (Even though voting is positively correlated
with γ, increasing average γ doesn’t necessarily increase voter turnout.)
Proof. We can directly construct limiting equilibria in this environment in amanner similar
to Aytimur et al. (2014). is construction is simpler if we re-imagine s to be a continuous
signal distributed according to Fγ(s ∣ θ) which is ex-ante distributed uniformly on [0, 1].
is is a more general construction (Lehmann, 1988) if F is allowed to be constant.18 But
for simplicity I assume Fγ(s ∣ θ) is strictly increasing and continuous. A similar proof holds
for the discrete case, but requires the use of cumbersome correspondences to handle mixed
strategies.
18We can construct a continuous signal from a discrete signal in the following way: First, num-
ber the signal space as S = {1, 2, . . . , ∣S∣}. Second, split the interval [0, 1] into ∣S∣ distinct intervals,[0, 1/∣S∣), [2/∣S∣, 3/∣S∣), . . . , [(∣S∣ − 1)/∣S∣, 1]. Our transformed signal s′ will be constructed by rst observing
the realization of s, then drawing uniformly from [(s − 1)/∣S∣, s/∣S∣). s′ is equivalent to s but has a continuous
piecewise linear cumulative distribution function. Now, transform the signal again to s′′ so that s′′ = F(s′ ∣ θ).
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For further simplicity, consider the case where preferences for the two candidates are
symmetric, so that ρA = ρB = 12 . is implies that the pivot probability is independent of
which candidate a player prefers. Accordingly I stop conditioning on the candidate for the
remainder of the proof.
A similar proof to the one for Proposition 17 establishes parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 18.
(For details, see the appendix.) Tond limit cutos, we nd cutos consistentwith equilibrium-
type behavior which generate that signaling value in the following way:
Pick some candidate signaling valueU0S , x some small pivot probability p, and let sp(γ)
denote the solutions to
Eγ[θ ∣ sp(γ)]p − k +U0S = 0. (A.1.28)
(If no such solution exists because (A.1.28) is strictly negative for all s, then let sp(γ) = 1.
If (A.1.28) is strictly positive for all s, then let sp(γ) = 0.) e cutos sp(γ) are the best
response strategies to the signaling value U0S .
Using sp(γ)we can then construct the corresponding signaling return to voting, assum-
ing sp(γ) is the strategy prole played:
U 1S(U0S ) ∶= E[γ ∣ sp, v] − E[γ ∣ sp,¬v]
= 1
P(v) ∫γ(1 − sp(γ)) dF(γ) − 1P(¬v) ∫γ sp(γ) dF(γ)
= 1
P(v) ∫γ 1 − sp(γ)P(¬v) dF(γ).
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Lemma 12. For all p, there exists a unique candidate signaling level U∗p so that U 1S(U∗p ) = k,
satisfying U∗p = (1 − p)k + pU∗1 .
Proof. First, consider U0S = U ∶= k − pEγ[θ ∣ s = 1] + ε, for some small ε. (ε is necessary
because the rm’s beliefsmay be discontinuous for ε = 0 and soU0S is set valued at k−pEγ[θ ∣
s = 1].)
Since γ orders Fγ via a rotation order, the player of type (γ, s = 1) has the highest expec-
tation of all the types of the marginal electoral value to voting. So (BR) for all types (γ, s),
γ < s, satises
pEγ[θ ∣ s] +U − k = p (Eγ[θ ∣ s] − Eγ[θ ∣ s = 1] − ε) < 0®
For ε small.
at is, for ε small only types close to γ vote, and so
lim
ε→0U 1S(U) = γ − E[γ] > k.
Similar reasoning for U0S = U = k − pEγ[θ ∣ s = 0] − ε establishes that
lim
ε→0U 1S(U) = E[γ] − γ < −k.
U 1S is continuous on [U ,U] for ε > 0. is follows by Lemma 5 and the assumption that
F(s ∣ θ) is continuous. e intermediate value theorem then implies that there is at least
one signaling level U∗p .
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To see that it is also unique, I claim that U 1S(U0S ) is decreasing.
at U∗p = (1 − p)k + pU∗1 follows because if s1(γ),U∗1 solves (A.1.28) for p = 1, then
Eγ[θ ∣ s1(γ)]p − k +U∗p = Eγ[θ ∣ s1(γ)]p − k + ((1 − p)k + pU∗1 )
= p(Eγ[θ ∣ s1(γ)] − k +U∗1 )
= 0.
Note that this also shows that sp(γ) is constant across p.
I claim that s1(γ) is the limiting strategy prole in equilibrium. is follows because
UNS → k, and s1(γ) is the unique strategy prole which delivers US = k. By continuity it
must be the limiting strategy prole in equilibrium.
For example, say that the signal structure is given by a linear experiment, so that condi-
tional expectations are linear:
Eγ[θ ∣ s] = γ (s − 12) + 12 , γ ∼ U[1/2, 1].
For xed US , the corresponding cutos are given by solving
γ (s(γ) − 1
2
) + 1
2
= k −US ,
which implies s(γ) = 12 + k−U− 12γ .
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Lemma 13. If type γ’s information matrix has rank ∣Θ∣, then no solution to the linear problem
given by (A.1.26) and (A.1.27) exists.
Proof. Denote a playerwith type γ’s informationmatrix asP = (Pγ(si ∣ θ j))i j, and letM = ∣S∣
and T = ∣Θ∣. IfP has rank ∣Θ∣, then thematrix of conditional probabilities A = (Pγ(θ j ∣ si))i j
also has rank ∣Θ∣, because
A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
Pγ(s1) 0 ⋯ 0
0 1Pγ(s2) 0⋮ ⋱ 0
0 0 ⋯ 1Pγ(sM)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Rank ∣S∣ > ∣Θ∣
P
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P(θ1) 0 ⋯ 0
0 P(θ2) 0
⋮ ⋱ 0
0 0 ⋯ P(θT)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Rank ∣Θ∣
.
Consider the linear problem
T∑
i=1 P(θ i ∣ s)g(θ i) = k −US ∀s.
Since Ahas rank ∣Θ∣ any solution is unique, and since P is a probabilitymeasure that solution
is g(θ i) = k−US ∀i. But g(θ i) = k−US does not satisfy g(0) = 0, because if k−US = 0 then
all players strictly prefer to vote.
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A.1.1 e conditional marginal electoral value, written explicitly
e conditional marginal electoral value, θP(piv ∣ θ), to a player who prefers candidate A,
is
θ
∞∑
k=0
e−NVAθ(NVAθ)k
k!
e−NVBθ(NVBθ)k
k!
(1 + NVBθ
k + 1 ) , (A.1.29)
where
VCθ ∶= ∫
γ
∑
s
σ(γ, s,C)ρCPγ(s ∣ θ) dF(γ),C ∈ {A,C}. (A.1.30)
A.2 Numerical results
In this section I present the results of a discrete-time approximation to non-stationary equi-
libria of the game, and show that the distribution over state variables converges to the sta-
tionary equilibria analyzed in Section 1.5. Computing the numerical approximation works
in the following way:
1. Begin with an initial probability measure, µ0.
2. Pick a stationary strategy prole for α players, Aα.en, in every tth period,
(a) From µt , compute the marginal beliefs of β players, Pµt(Aα(ρ˜tα , ρ˜tβ) = 1 ∣ ρ˜tβ =
ρβ), and use this to formulate their best reply from 1.4.11.
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Figure 4: Numerical simulation of equilibrium non-stationary distribution.
In the top le, we begin with a uniform measure on [0, 1]2.e darker the color, the larger the measure. (e
color has been normalized within images, and is not comparable between images.) As the game proceeds, the
measure converges to the stationary measure of the game, bottom right.
(b) Numerically update µt to µt+1 with the discrete-time approximation to the laws
of motion (1.4.3), (1.4.4), and repeat.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the results when beginning with a uniform, normal, and
skew normal distribution, in each case, the probability measure on the state space tends
to converge to the same stationary distribution. In gure 7, we begin with an unbalanced
uniform distribution on the square [ 34 , 1]× [ 34 , 1].e probability measure converges to two
xed points, at (1, 1) and (0, 0), because there is not enough initial uncertainty in the value
of the state variable to support mixed strategies by β players, and so both player types pool.
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Figure 5: Numerical simulation of equilibrium non-stationary distribution, part 2.
In the top le, we begin with a truncated normal distribution on [0, 1]2, centered at ( 12 , 12 ).
Figure 6: Numerical simulation of equilibrium non-stationary distribution, part 3.
In the top le, we begin with a non-symmetric normal distribution on [0, 1]2, centered at ( 12 , 12 ).
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Figure 7: Numerical simulation of equilibrium non-stationary distribution, part 4.
In the top le, we begin with a non-symmetric, unbalanced probability distribution which converges to two
xed points, one at (0, 0), the other at (1, 1).
A.3 Classifying outcome paths
Fix a strategy prole, ⟨Aα ,Aβ⟩, a corresponding state path (ρtα , ρtβ), and an initial condi-
tion, (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β). e resulting set of states traced out by the outcome path is called the orbit,
S = (ρ[0,∞)α (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β), ρ([0,∞)β (ρˆ0α , ρˆ0β)). A state (ρˆα , ρˆβ) is a xed point if (s˙tα , s˙tβ) = (0, 0),
and a periodic point if (ρˆα , ρˆβ) = (ρtα , ρtβ) = (ρt+Pα , ρt+Pβ ), for some t, P > 0, but (ρˆα , ρˆβ) ≠
(ρt′α , ρt′β )∀t′ ∈ (0, P).
e ω-limit set of S is the set of cluster points of the orbit, S. e following result,19
19See Hájek (1968) for a statement and proof, briey, here the ow equation is only continuous, and so
a generalization of the standard theorem, which requires dierentiability everywhere of the state path, is re-
quired.
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together with the fact that under a stationary equilibrium the orbit must be its ω-limit set,
implies that in stationary equilibria, behavior is either xed or periodic.
Theorem 2 (Poincaré-Bendixson). e ω-limit set of the orbit S either contains a xed point,
or contains only periodic points.
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